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Most children in Sierra Leone have been involved in the war in
many more ways than just carrying a weapon. They have
experienced kidnapping, murder, pillaging,fleeing, loss of family,
wounding, mutilation, rape-whetherpassively as victim or witness
or actively as perpetrator.

INTRODUCTION

For nearly a decade, Sierra Leone was wracked by a civil war that
transformed children into armed combatants, left thousands of
civilians maimed, and deprived its citizens of national peace. While
hostilities subsided as a result of foreign military intervention,
questions remain as to whether Sierra Leone will stand on its own and
proceed into an era of durable peace. 2 If succeeding generations are to
see a new Sierra Leone, resilient to conflict, Sierra Leone's national
government and the international community alike must learn from
Sierra Leone's bloodstained past.
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991.' Civil war raged on
through 2002, 4 despite the efforts of Sierra Leonean nationals,5
1. TEUN VOETEN, How DE BODY? ONE MAN'S TERRIFYING JOURNEY THROUGH

AN AFRICAN WAR 229-30 (Roz Vatter-Buck trans., Thomas Dunne Books 2002)
(2000).
2.
[S]ierra Leonean security forces are still highly dependent on foreign
assistance: a British officer oversees the police force, and the new national
army that was trained by Great Britain is proving unable on its own to
offer any resistance to the armed men who cross the border in the district
of Kailahun.
Fabrice Weissman, Sierra Leone: Peace at Any Price, in IN THE SHADOW OF 'JUST
WARS':

VIOLENCE,

POLITICS

AND

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

43, 64 (Fabrice

Weissman & Fiona Terry eds., Vincent Homolka, Roger Leverdier & Fiona Terry
trans., Cornell Univ. Press 2004).
3. PAUL RICHARDS, FIGHTING FOR THE RAINFOREST: WAR, YOUTH &
RESOURCES INSIERRA LEONE 4 (1996).

4. Weissman, supra note 2, at 51-52.
5. A national group called the Civil Defense Force tried to limit rebel violence
by arming themselves and defending civilians. Sarah Williams, Amnesties in
International Law: The Experience of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 5 HUM.
RTs. L. REv. 271, 274 (2005). Additionally, the Sierra Leone Parliament formed the
National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights in December 1996 to
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
protect civilians against human rights violations.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11

2

2007]

Bartholomew: Constructing Durable Peace: Lessons From Sierra Leone
CONSTRUCTING DURABLE PEACE

regional

organizations, 6

and

8

international

institutions 7

119

using
9

diplomatic negotiation, truth and reconciliation commissions, ad hoc
human rights tribunals,' 0 economic sanctions, 1 and peacekeeping
operations.' 2 Additionally, three separate peace agreements were
promulgated,
encompassing
many
of
the
aforementioned
peacebuilding mechanisms. These three peace agreements are the
Abidjan Accord, 13 the Conakry Peace Plan, 14 and the Lom6 Peace

PROTECTORS OR PRETENDERS? GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSIONS IN

AFRICA 54 (2001). Unfortunately, this group has been challenged by insufficient
funding and interruption by war. Id.
6. Some scholars suggest that ECOWAS, the Economic Community of West
African States, was responsible for bringing an end to the rule of the military junta
in 1998. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 5, at 274 (2005) ("International pressure and
military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) in early 1998 removed the AFRC [Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council] and restored President Kabbah and the SLPP [Sierra Leone People's Party]
to power.").
7. The U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone, or "UNAMSIL," was charged with
keeping the peace in Sierra Leone in 1999. SIMON CHESTERMAN, You, THE
PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION, AND STATEBUILDING 86 (2004). Unfortunately, the commission failed, "nearly collaps[ing] as

a result of poor planning, under-equipped and badly trained personnel, inadequate
communication, weak to the point of mutinous command and control, and
determined local spoilers." Id.
8. For example, the U.N. Secretary-General appointed Berhanu Dinka special
envoy in 1995 in hopes that he could successfully mediate a peaceful resolution
between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government. See John Hirsch, Sierra Leone,
in THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 524

(David M. Malone ed., 2004).
9. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established "in hopes of
bringing peace to a country that has known no such thing for the past decade."
Laura R. Hall & Nahal Kazemi, Prospectsfor Justice and Reconciliation in Sierra
Leone, 44 HARV. INT'T L.J. 287, 287 (2003).
10. The Special Court of Sierra Leone was established "in hopes of bringing
peace" as well. Id.
11.

DAVID KEEN, CONFLICT & COLLUSION IN SIERRA LEONE 212-13 (2005).

12. Laura Forest, Sierra Leone and Conflict Diamonds: Establishing a Legal
Diamond Trade and Ending Rebel Control Over the Country'sDiamond Resources,
11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 633, 644 (2001).
13. The Abidjan Accord was signed in 1996. Peace Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone (RUF/SL), Nov. 30, 1996 [hereinafter Abidjan Accord], available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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Agreement.' 5 Regrettably, none of these agreements succeeded in
16
ending the Sierra Leone conflict.
The Abidjan Accord was the first comprehensive peace agreement
between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leone
Conditions
government since the Civil War began in 1991.17
predating the negotiation of the Abidjan Accord made the prospects
for immediate peace out of reach from the start.' 8 Additionally,
ambiguities in the peace agreement concerning third party
peacekeeping and RUF reintegration issues rendered the Abidjan
Accord a non-starter. 19 The Conakry Peace Plan was an improvement
upon the Abidjan Accord, with more specific terms on political
integration and peacekeeping. 20 Nonetheless, hostilities resumed soon
after the Conakry Peace Plan was adopted as a result of the parties'
reciprocal mistrust and misunderstanding. 2 1 Following the Conakry
Peace Plan was the Lom6 Peace Agreement, the most comprehensive
peace agreement of the three. Despite the improvements, the Lom6
22
Peace Agreement failed to establish durable peace on its own.
While peace eventually followed the Lom6 Peace Agreement, the
cessation of hostilities was a credit to the foreign military intervention
and supplemental provisions adopted years after Lom6 was signed.2 3
14. The Conakry Peace Plan was signed in 1997. ECOWAS Six Month Peace
Plan for Sierra Leone S/1997/824, Oct. 23, 1997 [hereinafter Conakry Peace Plan],
availableat http://www.sierra-leone.org/conakryaccord.html.
15. The Lomd Peace Agreement was signed in 1999. The Peace Agreement
Between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of
Sierra Leone, July 7 1999 [hereinafter Lom6 Peace Agreement], available at http:
Hwww. sierra- leone.org/lomeaccord .html.
16. See Daniel J. Macaluso, Absolute and Free Pardon: The Effect of the
Amnesty Provision in the Lomi Peace Agreement on the Jurisdictionof the Special
Courtfor Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347, 348 (2001).
17. Abidjan Accord, supra note 13.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. Id.
20. See infra Part III.B.
21. Id.
22. See infra Part III.C.
23. The Lomd Peace Agreement was broken within a year of being adopted in

1999. CHESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 86. Peace was not declared in Sierra Leone
until 2002, when U.N. and British troops were successful in halting the fighting.
Weissman, supra note 2, at 44.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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Though peace has been declared in Sierra Leone, current political
conditions remain precarious at best.2 4 Yet, there is hope for Sierra
Leone. With violence in remission, both Sierra Leone and the
international community have the opportunity to reflect on failed
peace efforts with an eye toward preventing similar crises from
reoccurring. The clarity of hindsight, coupled with the relatively
peaceful conditions in Sierra Leone today, signify that there is no time
like the present to analyze the most and least effective aspects of
Sierra Leone's three failed peace agreements. By studying the
historical background of the Sierra Leone Civil War and scrutinizing
the Abidjan Accord, the Conakry Peace Plan, and the Lom6 Peace
Agreement, the Sierra Leone experience reveals the weaknesses of
these agreements, which were unsuccessful despite incorporating an
arsenal of peacekeeping mechanisms. The work of Virginia Page
Fortna can provide the framework for studying these peace
agreements, and illuminate the specific inadequacies in each.
In her book, Peace Time, Fortna posits that peace agreements are
not merely scraps of paper, but potentially effective institutional
mechanisms in preventing post-conflict countries from receding back
into a state of war.2 ' The core of Fortna's theory is that belligerents
are less likely to resume hostilities when peace agreements make
military attacks more costly, promote each party's clear understanding
of their adversary's intentions, and decrease the probability of
accidents which may ignite future conflict.26
Fortna's two-tier schema for durable peace sets forth: (1) the key
pre-existing conditions which establish the baseline for prospective
peace; and (2) those peace agreement components which are

24. While Sierra Leone's President Kabbah has led the country for the past five
years without interruption by rebel forces or military coup d'etat, the change in
power accompanying the August 2007 Presidential elections may change Sierra
Leone's political climate considerably. See Peacebuilding Commission Chairman,
Report of the PeacebuildingCommission mission to Sierra Leone, 6, delivered to
the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/2007/269, A/61/901

(May 10, 2007).
25. VIRGINIA

PAGE FORTNA, PEACE TIME: CEASEFIRE AGREEMENTS AND THE
DURABILITY OF PEACE (2004).

26. Id. at 24.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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indispensable to promoting durable peace. 27
The first-tier
"situational" variables which dictate the baselines for peace are: 28
1. Military outcome of war
2. Cost of war
3. Number of parties involved
4. Historical context and past conflicts
5. Stakes of the parties
6. Territory disputes
7. Geographic contiguity
8. Relative capabilities at the time of ceasefire
The second-tier factors which lend themselves to stronger peace

29
agreements are:

1. Separating troops from the ceasefire line
2. Creating demilitarized zones
3. Imposing arms control measures
4. Peacekeeping and third-party guarantees
5. Drafting ceasefire agreements with specificity
6. Implementing confidence-building measures
7. Establishing dispute resolution procedures
8. Formalizing the agreement
Her hypothesis, confirmed by statistical analysis, is that peace
agreements are not merely epiphenomenal; Fortna concludes, to the
contrary, that comprehensive peace agreements can foster durable
peace, even where it is least likely.3"
The purpose of this article is twofold. The first objective is to
apply Fortna's schema to the crisis in Sierra Leone to uncover what
can be done to make peace agreements durable, resilient, and lasting.
More broadly, this article also suggests a new framework for durable
peace, which draws from the Sierra Leone case study, but can be
applied to peacebuilding efforts in any post-conflict country. Part I
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

25-29, 36, 76-82.
77-82.
25-29.
149-50.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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provides the historical background of the conflict in Sierra Leone.
Investigating the sociological context and the historical underpinnings
of the conflict illustrates the underlying political motivation for the
RUF's uprising and the civil war that ensued. This historical
foundation helps to explain why each of the three preeminent peace
agreements proved insufficient in providing a legal resolution to the
conflict. 31 Part II lays out Fortna's two-tier schema for durable peace.
The first tier comprises eight situational factors that establish the
baselines for peace before a ceasefire agreement is adopted, while the
second tier lays out the eight factors which, if included in the peace
agreement, help to foster lasting peace. Part III then applies Fortna's
schema to analyze the Abidjan Accord, Conakry Peace Plan, and
This analysis reveals the various
Lom6 Peace Agreement.
shortcomings in the respective peace agreements. It also identifies
different mechanisms that may be employed to achieve durable peace
in Sierra Leone. Part IV draws from the findings in Part III,
suggesting modifications to Fortna's schema and offering a more
comprehensive framework for analyzing peace agreements in Sierra
The author argues that Fortna's revised
Leone and beyond.
framework can provide a new approach to durable peace in Sierra
Leone when it is used to identify the gaps in peacebuilding efforts.
Additionally, Part IV explains how the revised peace durability
schema can be used in any other post-conflict country for two
purposes: (1) to identify the weakness(es) in failed peace agreements,
and (2) to provide a checklist for parties drafting peace agreements for
the first time. Part V offers some final thoughts on the future of Sierra
Leone and describes the benefits of the interdisciplinary exchange
between International Law and International Relations in promoting
durable peace in post-conflict countries.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Sierra Leone was an English colony in the nineteenth century and
did not gain independence until 1961.32 At this time, "Sierra Leone

31. For a discussion on the legalization of peace agreements, see Christine
Bell, Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 373
(2006).
32.

VOETEN, supra note 1, at 301.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

7

Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 11
124 California
CALIFORNIA
WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38

was not a particularly likely candidate for civil war," 33 possessing
sufficient natural resources and a notable education system.3 4 Some
say that Sierra Leone's easily-accessible alluvial diamonds and shared
3
border with Liberia are to blame for the war which began in 1991 .
A. Events Precedingthe Civil War in SierraLeone
It is an oversimplification to refer to conflict in Sierra Leone as a
national war.36
The motivation to overthrow the national
government,37 a significant portion of the soldiers,38 and even RUF
military tactics originated from outside Sierra Leone's national
borders. 39 Of all the countries influencing the conflict in Sierra

33. KEEN, supra note 11, at 8.

34. Id. See also Amanda Bryant Banat, Note, Solving the Problem of Conflict
Diamonds in Sierra Leone: Proposed Market Theories and International Legal
Requirements for Certification of Origin, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 939, 940
(2002) ("Formerly a country with a citizenry of strong academic and artistic
achievement, as well as entrepreneurial abilities, this nation has experienced a vast
decline in the past twenty years.").
35. KEEN, supra note 11, at 8. See also Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana,
The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat,
AFRICAN GUERRILLAS 179 (1998) ("A significant portion of the Liberia border

region into which the RUF incursion spilled is forested boundary enclave with
considerable scope for clandestine smuggling, logging and diamond digging
activities. One of the options for young lumpens seeking a job was to drift into this
off-limits frontier area and participate in illicit activities. The RUF pincer
movement encircled this zone, and found within it considerable numbers of potential
recruits sharing the lumpen worldview of the RUF leadership." (citations omitted)).
36. Hirsch describes the Sierra Leone crisis as featuring "cross-border
warfare." Hirsch, supra note 8, at 522.
37. See discussion of Charles Taylor's political motivation to organize an RUF
attack on the Sierra Leonean government in note 41, infra.
38. The RUF had African members from outside of Sierra Leone, and many of
these were from Liberia. Williams, supra note 5, at 274 (indicating that the RUF's
March, 1991 attacks comprised soldiers from Sierra Leone "and nationals of other
African States"); see also RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 5 (stating that the pre-invasion
RUF ranks comprised "Liberian mercenaries" in addition to Sierra Leonean
nationals).
39. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 35, at 177.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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Leone, Liberia's impact has been the greatest.4 ° Scholars identify
former President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, as the principle supporter,
organizer and financier of the RUF.4 1 The then-Liberian President
had his own political incentives to disrupt the Sierra Leone national
government.4 2
The youth comprising the group that came to be known as the
RUF proved to be integral in Taylor's plan to disrupt President
Kabbah's regime. Rebellious university students in Freetown, Sierra
Leone, began protesting in the seventies against the All People's
Congress (APC) party which had control of the government at the
The APC, which held power of the Sierra Leonean
time.4 3
government into the eighties, was infamous for marginalizing ethnic
groups, promulgating policies which encouraged unequal distribution
of wealth, and institutionalizing corruption. 44 The number of antigovernment student activities swelled in the eighties, when an

40. Richards argues that "[t]he immediate origins of the insurgency in Sierra
Leone are to be found in the events associated with the civil war in neighbouring
Liberia." RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 2.

41. See RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 4 ("Encouraged and supplied by Taylor,
and supported by Liberian and Burkinabe mercenaries from the NPFL, the RUF
leadership waited for its moment to launch an NPFL-style holiday-time incursion
from across the Liberian border into Sierra Leone."). See also Weissman, supra
note 2, at 45 ('The Sierra Leonean conflict is generally presented as an off-shoot of
the Liberian civil war. It was with the help of Charles Taylor, at that time engaged
in a merciless struggle to conquer Liberia by armed force, that Sierra Leonean rebels
launched a revolt in eastern Sierra Leone in March 1991."); Hall & Kazemi, supra
note 9, at 288 ("the Revolutionary United Front, a paramilitary group ... widely
").
believed to be supported and financed by Charles Taylor ....
rebel movement was
Leonean
4
("The
Sierra
note
3,
at
supra
42. RiCHARDS,
formed from among political exiles and economic refugees in Liberia .... It was in

Taylor's interest to support the destabilization of the Sierra Leone government, firm
supporters of the international peacekeeping effort in Liberia."); Weissman, supra
note 2, at 45 ("For Taylor, the RUF was a means of destabilising a country he
regarded as hostile due to its participation in the West African intervention force
deployed in Liberia for the purpose of preventing his accession to power. The RUF
was also an auxiliary force that allowed the future Liberian president to increase
security along a border harbouring the rear bases of a rival faction...").
43. The protesting students "became the articulate mouthpiece of a disaffected
youth cohort attacking APC rule and calling for fundamental change." Abdullah &
Muana, supra note 35, at 174.
44. Williams, supra note 5, at 274.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

9

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 11

126 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

economic downturn dramatically reduced spending on social services
and financial aid for college, giving would-be students the free time
required to organize and express their frustrations with the political
regime.45 Sierra Leone's young people were impatient for change,
or denied the opportunity to
having been "exploited by gem traffickers
46
participate in the urban economy."
The more militant students who protested against school politics
and national politics were expelled.47 A few of the ousted students
took up residence in Ghana, where they established a connection
between counter-government youths in Sierra Leone and guerilla
training camps in Benghazi, Libya. 48 Foday Sankoh, who became the
leader of the RUF, found his way to a Libyan training camp through
one such intermediary. 49 Indeed, "[a]ll those who went to Libya for
military and ideological training in 1987-8 and later, like Sankoh,
became involved in the RUF, returned to Sierra Leone before the
50
launching of the armed struggle."

B. Civil War
On March 23, 1991, the RUF invaded eastern Sierra Leone 100

strong from Liberia. 5

Any political goals beyond the rebel group's

endeavor to destroy the APC's rule were unclear. 52 The RUF
proceeded to make gains in the southern and eastern territories of
Sierra Leone by looting villages and conscripting young foot
45. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 35, at 175 ("Dwindling mining revenues,
worsened by rampant smuggling, caused a sharp economic downturn, exacerbated
by lavish spending on the 1980 Organization of African Unity (OAU) conference.
Student scholarships and spending on health and social services declined. The
swelling ranks of the young unemployed fuelled subversive discourse in the pote").
46. Weissman, supra note 2, at 43.
47. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 34, at 176.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 177.
51. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 4-5.
52. Richards states that while the "RUF's announced political programme was
to overthrow the APC one-party regime," at the time of the 1991 mobilization
"[m]ost Sierra Leoneans assumed that the RUF was no more than a Taylor-inspired
project to undermine Sierra Leone for its involvement in the Nigerian-led peacekeeping operation in Liberia." Id. at 5.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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soldiers. 53 Within months, the RUF was pushed back into Liberia by
the Sierra Leone Army and the United Liberian Movement for
Democracy (ULIMO). 54
When Sierra Leonean military soldiers staged a mutiny in 1992,
then-President Momoh fled for Guinea. 55 The APC-defecting soldiers
filled the power vacuum by appointing Captain Valentine Strasser
Chairman of the National Provision Ruling Council (NPRC). 56 For
the most part, the youth of Sierra Leone embraced the coup as a
refreshing change 57 from almost two decades of one-party
governance. 58 The NPRC cancelled the elections planned by the
predecessor regime and made declarations of institutional reform and
infrastructural development. 59 Taking a hint from the RUF, the NPRC
sought support for what was portrayed as a new chapter in Sierra
Leone governance by conscripting young soldiers in the nation's
diamond mining region. 60 The NPRC was successful in defending an
APC counter-coup; to secure their position of power, NPRC officials
detained and executed APC politicians and members of the Freetown
police force. 61 During this time, RUF insurgencies persisted with
rebels ambushing civilian villages, taking foreigners hostage, and even
disguising themselves as refugees in the process.62 The RUF had
made some significant territorial gains by 1995, prompting the NPRC
Chairman, Strasser, to suggest negotiating a cease-fire with the RUF

53. Id.
54. In the summer of 1991, the RUF controlled a substantial portion of Sierra
Leone, primarily along the Liberian border. Id. Opposition from the Sierra Leone
government military and ULIMO succeeded in pushing the RUF back over the
Liberian border before the New Year. Id. at 5-9.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id.
57. See id. ("The coup was widely welcomed by the majority of Sierra
Leoneans, especially by the youths, as offering the country a new start.").
58. Williams, supra note 5, at 274.
59.

RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 9.

60. Id. at 10.
61. Id. at 12-13.
62. Id. at 14-15. Government soldiers also took advantage of the opportunity
to pillage. These "sobels,"-also known as "soldier by day, rebel by night"-looted
civilian villages in such a way that it seemed rebels and not government soldiers had
done the raiding. Id. at 14. See also Weissman, supra note 2, at 47.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007
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to minimize losses. 63 The RUF responded to this invitation

by indicating that there would be no peace talks until all foreign troops
withdrew. 64 The RUF was especially concerned with "Executive

Outcomes," a private outfit of questionable legitimacy, being expelled
from Sierra Leone. 65 Unable to reach a meeting of the minds even on
the terms of negotiation, the RUF refused to participate in the NPRCplanned forthcoming election.66 Instead, the RUF embarked on a
brutal series of raids during which they maimed thousands of
civilians. 67 While some commentators describe this limb amputation
campaign as either a political response to candidate Kabbah "the
future is in your hands" motto6 8 or a method designed to physically
prevent citizens from voting,69 other scholars insist the simple

63.

RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 16.

64. Id. at 17.
65. See id. ("Executive Outcomes, a South African security firm with mining
interests... [had a contract with the Sierra Leone government] offer[ing] a diamond
concession in Kono valued at $US30 million ....

Executive outcomes trains and

assists RSMLF soldiers in operations. The company is reported to have ring-fenced
its mineral concessions in Kono with land mines.") Executive Outcomes was
widely regarded as a mercenary outfit. See Kirsti Samuels, JusAd Bellum and Civil
Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community's Approach to Violence in
the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 8 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 315, 323 (2003)

(referring to Executive Outcomes as a "mercenary company"); see also Weissman,
supra note 2, at 47-48; LANSANA GBERIE, A DIRTY WAR IN WEST AFRICA: THE RUF
AND THE DESTRUCTION OF SIERRA LEONE 93 (2005) (describing Executive
Outcomes as "mercenaries"). But see GREG CAMPBELL, BLOOD DIAMONDS:
TRACING THE DEADLY PATH OF THE WORLD'S MOST PRECIOUS STONES 75 (2002)
("Executive Outcomes [is] a South African security company that is to private
armies what De Beers is to diamonds. Founded in 1989 by Eeben Barlow, a former
South African special forces officer, EO is either the embodiment of all the worst
things about mercenaries or a source of stability and security in a continent that has
been abandoned by Europe and America to fend for itself. It depends on whom you
ask. EO's operations are not necessarily shady.").
66. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 17.

67. Sierra Leone "War Hero" On Trial, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ africa/3793727.stm.
68. Weissman, supra note 2, at 47.
69. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 17. GBERIE, supra note 65, at 94-95.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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explanation that the horrific human rights abuses perpetrated by the
RUF were merely senseless violence and intimidation.7 °
Between 1995 and 1996, Executive Outcomes managed to gain
control or destroy most of the RUF's strategic bases and diamond
territories. 7 ' With relative stability achieved, the NPRC proceeded
with the U.N. sponsored two part election in February and March of
1996.72 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of the Sierra Leone People's Party was
again elected President. 73 The RUF did not participate in the
elections. 74
The RUF soon decided to go to the negotiating tables with
President Kabbah. RUF leader Foday Sankoh manifested the RUF's
intention to reach an agreement by signing the Abidjan Accord on
November 30, 1996. 75 President Kabbah was also a signatory on
76
behalf of the Sierra Leone government.
C. The Abidjan Accord
The Abidjan Accord provided for a ceasefire that would take
effect immediately, including complete disarmament "as soon as
practicable. 77 Unfortunately, this peace agreement was virtually dead
on arrival.78 The RUF failed to comply with the Abidjan Accord; they

70. See Samuels, supra note 65, at 323 ("The rebels engaged in a vicious
conflict of intimidation from the first, attacking civilians in what has now become
their hallmark fashion, crudely amputating the limbs and ears of women, men,
children and babies.").

See also Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9, at 288 ("The RUF

concentrated its attacks on the countryside, killing and maiming hundreds of
thousand of civilians before reaching a peace agreement with the democratically
elected government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in November 1996." (citation
omitted)).
71.

RICHARDS,

supra note 3, at 17;

VOETEN,

supra note 1, at 302.

See also

Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9, at 288.
72. GBERIE, supra note 65, at 94-95; Macaluso, supra note 16, at 349.
73. GBERIE, supra note 65, at 95; Macaluso, supranote 16, at 349.
74.
75.

supra note 1, at 302.
See GBERIE, supra note 65, at 95; see also Abidjan Accord, supra note 13.
VOETEN,

76. GBERIE, supra note 65, at 95; see also Abidjan Accord, supra note 13.
77.

See Abidjan Accord, supra note 13.

78. KEEN, supra note 11, at 193 ("The 1996 Abidjan agreement represented an
opportunity to defuse the power of the army and the rebels and of the emerging
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were apprehensive about being punished under the Accord and
tempted by the comparatively higher economic rewards of war vis-Avis peace.7 9 Sankoh in particular was reluctant to fulfill the RUF's
Abidjan Accord obligations, wanting fewer U.N. peacekeepers than
required by the peace agreement, 80 and "keep[ing] the RUF rank-andfile in the dark about the nature of the Abidjan Accord in order to keep
them loyal to him and fighting for him." 8 1 RUF members grew
restless with Sankoh's rigid tactics and lack of international
bargaining power, and sought to replace him with Philip Palmer as the
new RUF leader. 82 The RUF became divided between pro-Palmer
members and Sankoh loyalists. 8 3 Some scholars argue that the Sierra
Leonean government's recognition of the RUF fracture further
frustrated implementation of the Abidjan Accord and instigated RUF
84
participation in the 1997 military coup.
The NPRC launched a military coup of the Sierra Leone
government on May 25, 1997, by blowing the doors off of the
Pademba Road prison in Freetown and freeing 600 convicts. 85 Set
free, Major Koroma-imprisoned for his involvement with a
December 1996 coup attempt-led the government overthrow and
proclaimed himself the Chairman of the Armed Forces Revolutionary

army-rebel bloc. But it was not long before the agreement was running into
difficulties.").
79. Id. at 193 ("It soon became clear that Sankoh and other RUF hardliners
were reluctant to honour the Abidjan agreement. RUF commanders appear to have
feared retaliation or punishment under the peace conditions. Another consideration
was the economic benefits of warfare, benefits that were usually far more substantial
for commanders than for their often impoverished followers").
80. While the U.N. Secretary-General suggested 720 peacekeepers and sixty
military observers, Sankoh preferred sixty observers and no peacekeepers. KEEN,
supra note 11, at 194.
81. Id. at 195.
82. Id. Indeed, Sankoh had a reputation for being inflexible since it was well
known that he was "perennially suspicious of the UN." Id. at 194 n.5.
83. Id. at 195.
84. Id. ("The loyalty of bush commanders to Sankoh rather than Palmer proved
a major obstacle to the implementation of the Abidjan accord. Indeed, many
observers saw RUFD participation in the May 1997 coup itself as a response by the
Sankoh faction to the Kabbah government's recognition of the breakaway of the
Palmer faction.").
85. Id. at 208.
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Council (AFRC). 8 6 All Koroma had to do was telephone Sankoh for
troops, and soon the military coup forces swelled with an RUF
contingency. 87 Ironically, the coup brought peace in its own right:
between the once-warring NPRC and RUF contingency, who
amicably joined forces to form the military junta government.8 8
International media exposure of the Sierra Leonean nationals
protesting the new AFRC/RUF regime with public demonstrations
was overshadowed by news coverage of ECOWAS's Monitoring
Group's ("ECOMOG") violent opposition to the coup. 89
The
international community responded to the coup by imposing economic
90
and military sanctions on Sierra Leone.
D. The Conakry Peace Plan
In October 1997, the military junta caved to international pressure
and signed the Conakry Peace Plan. 9 1 The Conakry Peace Plan is a
relatively short document which provides a six-month plan for peace,
including deadlines for ceasefire, disarmament, humanitarian aid, and
restoration of a constitutional government. 92 Rebel forces, still
unsatisfied with the fruit of negotiations, failed to obey the provisions
of this peace agreement. 93 Thus "[i]n the face of the junta's
intransigence, ECOMOG's mandate was changed from sanctionenforcement to actual military intervention, and in February 1998
ECOMOG forded the AFRC/RUF out of Freetown in a fierce,
prolonged battle." 94 In March 1998, after nine months of brutal
fighting and countless human rights abuses, ECOMOG managed to
push the AFRC and RUF to the northeastern border and restore
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 209.
89. Id. at 212. ECOMOG is the "Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group," the military arm of ECOWAS. Id. at 213.
90. Great Britain, the European Union, ECOWAS member states, and the
United Nations each imposed sanctions on Sierra Leone. Id. at 212-13.
91. Samuels, supra note 65, at 324.
92. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14.
93. Instead, the RUF gathered weapons and prepared to attack ECOMOG. See
KEEN, supra note 11, at 216.
94. Id. at 216.
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President Kabbah to power. 95 Though significantly weakened, the
RJF continued its campaign of diamond territory occupation and
civilian limb amputation with complete disregard for the Conakry
Peace Plan. 96 The military junta managed another significant attack
on the capitol in January 1999, widening the gap between the RUF
and the government of Sierra Leone.97 By the summer of 1999, it
became clear that the Conakry Peace Plan was not doing enough to
pacify RUF-Kabbah administration relations.
E. The Lom4 Peace Agreement
At the urging of Congress and the U.S. State Department,
President Kabbah acquiesced to negotiations with the RUF once again
in Lom6, Togo. 98 The result was the Lom6 Peace Agreement, signed
July 7, 1999. 99 Like those peace agreements that preceded it, Lom6
called for an immediate ceasefire.' 00 However, the Lom6 Peace
Agreement is distinct from the Abidjan Accord and the Conakry Peace
Plan in that it is more extensive in length and party obligations.101
The Lom6 Peace Agreement transformed the RUF into a political
party, thus integrating rebel forces into the democratic process.102 The
most controversial aspect of this agreement was the amnesty provision
at Article 9.103 This article called for pardon of Sankoh and all other
combatants for acts committed from the RUF's initial insurgency in

95. Williams, supra note 5, at 274.

96. Id. at 275.
97.

KEEN, supra note 11, at 248.

98. Id. at 250-51.
99. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15.

100. Id. art. 1.
101. See generally Lomd Peace Agreement, supra note 15.
102. Id. arts. 3-5.
103. Id. art. 9. The amnesty provision in the Lom6 Peace Agreement was
equally controversial as the amnesty provision in the Abidjan Accord. Many
commentators have criticized the inclusion of article nine in the Lom6 Peace
Agreement. See, e.g., Macaluso, supra note 16, at 357; Chandra Lekha Sriram,
Wrong-Sizing International Justice? The Hybrid Tribunal in Sierra Leone, 29
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 472, 485-86 (2006). But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 5, at 53; Williams, supra note 5; Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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March 1991 through the date of Lomr's signing.' 0 4 Another key
aspect of Lom6 was that it provided the documentary basis for the
largest U.N. peacekeeping
mission to date at the time the blue helmets
0 5
were deployed.1
Despite its distinguishing characteristics, the Lom6 Peace
Agreement failed just as its predecessors did, most notably in 2000
when RUF forces took 500 U.N. peacekeepers hostage.' 0 6 While this
peace agreement has been referenced and supplemented in the years
that followed, an answer to the conflict in Sierra Leone cannot be
found within the four corners of this document.' 0 7 Peace was finally
declared in Sierra Leone
in 2002 after British and U.N. forces had
08
stopped the fighting. 1
II.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Finding the formula for maintaining durable peace in Sierra Leone
compels an examination of the antecedents of war so that these
catalysts can be avoided or prevented. By examining Sierra Leone's
unstable past using the proper theoretical framework, the most crucial
elements of war prevention can be uncovered. There are competing
theories offered by international relations scholars concerning what

104. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. 9.
105.

A major incentive for U.N. military intervention in Sierra Leone was to

demonstrate a commitment to Africa in light of the less successful peacekeeping
initiatives in Somalia and Rwanda. Hirsch, supra note 8, at 521.
106. Williams, supra note 5, at 275.

107. For example, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was established in
August, 2000, which may suggest that the Lom6 Agreement's amnesty provision

and creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were not adequate dispute
resolution procedures on their own. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art.
26. Additionally, there are lingering questions on how to reconcile the authority of
the Lom6's amnesty provision, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and
Special Court. Specifically, the fact that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
shares concurrent jurisdiction with the Special Court, but has different evidentiary
standards, raises question about the admissibility of evidence. See Sriram, supra
note 103, at 478-80. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 53
(suggesting that the Lom6 Peace Agreement effectively ended the civil war in July
1999).
108. Sierra Leone Rebel Leader Dies, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3109521.stm.
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causes violent conflict. 109 Central to the current dialogue is the realistinstitutionalist paradigm. 10
Realists adopt the notion that countries interact in an anarchical
international system, taking the position that everything unfolding in
the realm of international politics is attributable to states interacting
with other states within this system.Ill Accordingly, they posit that
the uncertainty inherent to the international state of anarchy makes
war inevitable, as every state pursues its own interests. 112 Realists
also emphasize relative gains, viewing the anarchical system as a kind
of zero-sum game where one state's advantage is another state's

109. One commentator lists some of these theories as "character and
personality models, imbalances in power relationships among states, deterministic
world system models, nationalism, naturally aggressive tendencies of human nature,
institutionalist models of cooperation, economic theories of imperialism, theories of
special commercial advantage, environmental stress, and the misbehavior of nondemocratic regimes." James Kraska, Fear God and Dread Nought: Naval Arms
Control and Counterfactual Diplomacy Before the Great War, 34 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 43, 48-49 (2005). Perhaps the most well known theory is Kenneth Waltz's
three-image typology for world order. Waltz sets forth three different theories
which explain why countries go to war: (1) the first image posits that bad people are
responsible for war-leaders indulge the self-seeking and aggressive impulses
which are human nature; (2) the second image posits that bad states instigate
conflict-a state's diplomatic relations are determined by the domestic political
structure and regime type; and (3) the third image posits that war is the natural result
of an international state of anarchy-that states, free from a global enforcement
mechanism, inevitably resort to conflict when it serves national interests. Much
credence is still given to Waltz' third image today, as reflected in the contemporary
debate between realist and institutionalist theories of addressing the so-called
international state of anarchy. KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN THE STATE AND WAR: A
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS (1959).

110. Under a section entitled "Two Views of Anarchic Politics," Joseph Nye
describes "realism" and "liberalism" (used interchangeably with "institutionalism"
in this context) to represent the respective pessimistic and optimistic views of the
international anarchical system.
JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., UNDERSTANDING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 4 (2d ed. 1997).
111. Id. at4.
112. Indeed, realists believe that "[w]ith many sovereign states, with no system
of law enforceable among them, with each state judging its grievances and
ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire--conflict, sometimes
leading to war, is bound to occur." WALTZ, supra note 109, at 159.
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disadvantage. 13 Institutionalists, on the other hand, purport that
international institutions as well as sovereign states play a relevant
role in international politics. '
Institutionalists, unlike realists,
believe that cooperation between states is possible because
international institutions and international rules are capable of
influencing state behavior, discouraging war, and diminishing the
unpredictability which creates distrust in international relations.'
Fortna manages to incorporate the best of both realist and
institutionalist theory by creating a two-tier formula for lasting
peace. 116

113. See ROBERT J. BECK ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RULES: APPROACHES FROM
148 (1996). See also NYE,
supra note 110, at 4.
114. BECKETAL., supra note 113, at 166.
115. Id.
116. Fortna's basic argument-that the contents of peace agreements can affect
state behavior-is premised on institutionalism. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 7
("Institutionalist theory rests on the claim that the existence and form of institutions
affect international relations by making cooperation easier to achieve. Critics of
institutionalism claim, on the contrary, that such arrangements are epiphenomenalthey are created reflecting the interests of major powers, and they fade away when
these interests shift, but they exert no independent influence on international
outcomes. Cease-fire agreements are not necessarily institutions, but because they
perform similar functions-providing information, setting standards of legitimate
behavior, and making the gains from cooperation later contingent on cooperation
now-scholarship on institutions is relevant to the study of peacemaking. An
empiricalanalysis of the impact of cease-fire agreements,particularlyone that takes
seriously the charge of spuriousness, sheds light on whether and how institutions
matter in internationalrelations." (emphasis added)). On the other hand, Fortna's
Baselines for Peace approach (in the first tier of her schema) gives a nod to realist
theory in the sense that it recognizes that the relative power of the parties involved
in the conflict may determine how these parties interact-that is, whether peace is
even likely. Id. at 18-19 ("[S]tates worry ... about the implications of the other
side's gains for their future security (relative gains). Relative gains matter because
if your partner gains more than you do from cooperation, it might use this advantage
against you in the future.
This means that states will avoid cooperative
arrangements that make both parties better off if the gains will be uneven . ...
Concerns over distribution and relative gains therefore exacerbate the other
obstacles to maintaining peace: the incentives to attack, fear of cheating, and the risk
of accidents. In sum, with no higher authority to enforce agreements, and with no
way of knowing each other's intentions, it is difficult for former belligerents to
maintain peace.").
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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A. First Tier: Situational Factors
The first tier of Fortna's schema sets out eight situational factors
which can be used to determine the likelihood that two parties will be
able to achieve lasting peace. The absence or presence of these eight
pre-existing conditions establish the "baseline prospects for peace"
before the peace agreement is even drafted." 7
1. Military outcome of the war
Fortna suggests that with respect to military outcome of a given
war, those that end in decisive victory rather than narrow defeat have
a better shot at resulting in durable peace. 11 8 The reasoning is that
rational leaders will choose not to fight inefficient wars, and thus the
party defeated by a large margin is less likely to pay the expenses for
war again when the prospective outcome is grim. 119
2. Cost of war

According to Fortna, countries may be less likely to go to war
when doing so is costly.' 20 The high cost of war creates an incentive
21
for cooperation, since cooperation is a less costly alternative to war.'

117. In a chapter entitled 'The Baseline Prospects for Peace," Fortna explains
that "not all cease-fires are created equal," and delineates those "situational
variables" which hinder or help the successful creation of a peace agreement." See
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 76-113.
118. Id. at 77-78. While this is Fortna's hypothesis at the outset, she
eventually concludes that "ties" fare no worse than clear wins when it comes to
creating lasting peace agreements. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 211.
119. Id. at 77-78.
120. While Fortna acknowledges that more deadly conflicts may make the
resumption of hostilities more likely (high body counts may make a belligerents less
amenable to concessions), she concludes that costliness generally discourages war.
Id. at 79, 92.
121. Id. at 92. Kenneth Waltz has also paid credence to the notion that war can
be a lose-lose scenario. See also WALTZ, supra note 107, at 1 ("[Asking] who won
a given war, someone has said, is like asking who won the San Francisco
earthquake. That in wars there is no victory but only varying degrees of defeat is a
proposition that has gained increasing acceptance in the twentieth century.").
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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3. Number of parties involved
Fortna acknowledges the argument that the number of parties
engaged can arguably make the prospect for peace better for either the
key players in multilateral conflicts or warring factions in bilateral
wars.' 2 2 However, Fortna concludes that the number of parties is not
23
determinative one way or another.
4. Historicalcontext and past conflicts
Fortna hypothesizes that belligerents who have a longer history of
124
fighting one another are less likely to establish peaceful relations.
That is, if hostilities have persisted over a long period of time, it may
indicate that resolution is impracticable or that each subsequent war
created increasingly more problems to solve.' 25 Fortna concludes that
more often than not, prospects for peace are dimmer for parties with a
history of conflict, particularly when the existence of a state is at
issue. 126

Prospective gains for attacking and prospective losses of being
attacked influence parties' incentives for peace. 127 When the stakes
are very high (when, for example, the very existence of a state is at
28
issue) then conciliation may be off the table.

122.

FORTNA,

supra note 25, at 79-80.

123. See id. at 212 ("Nor does the number of states involved in a war affect the

prospects for peace. The multilateral wars in the Middle East have resumed
repeatedly, but other multilateral wars have been followed by durable peace.").
124. Id. at 80.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 211 ("Peace is more difficult between enemies with a history of

conflict, particularly those whose struggle began at or before independence. It is
harder to achieve when one or both sides feel that their existence is threatened.").
But see id. at 122 ("However, it does appear that in repeated wars between the same
states, agreements tend to be stronger... [a]s states experience more conflict over
time, they strengthen their attempts to avoid it.").
127. Id. at 81.
128. Id.
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5. Territorydisputes
Citing research from other scholars, Fortna posits that territorial
conflicts are more difficult to pacify because they lend themselves to
enduring rivalries and escalating hostilities.1 29 This same reasoning
applies in the geographic contiguity factor.
6. Geographiccontiguity
Past studies have confirmed that neighboring countries fight each
other more often than do distant countries. 130 This is based on the
logic that geographic proximity reduces the costs of attacking and
increases the likelihood of shared disputes.' 3
7. Relative capabilitiesat the time of ceasefire
Recognizing the two divergent views in the academic
community, 132 Fortna initially hypothesizes that either relatively
comparable or clearly imbalanced capabilities can make the prospect
of peace more likely.' 33 She concludes that the change in relative
capabilities over time may influence the success of a peace
34
agreement. 1
B. Second Tier: DeliberateAttempts to Enhance Peace Durability
While the first tier factors predict the likelihood of peace, the
second tier factors help to guide belligerents to durable peace even
when it is unlikely. The thrust of Fortna's argument is that peace is
possible when the agreement makes the cost of attack high,
129. Id.
130. Id. at 81-82.
131. Id.
132. One school of thought is that when one party has a "preponderance of
power," both parties know who has the capacity to win which deters the weaker
party from re-engaging. Another school believes that relatively equal capabilities
deters both parties from re-engaging. Id. (citing INIS CLAUDE, POWER AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1962); A.F.K. ORGANSKI, WORLD POLITICS (2d ed.
1968)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 212.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11

22

Bartholomew: Constructing Durable Peace: Lessons From Sierra Leone

2007]

CONSTRUCTING DURABLE PEACE

uncertainty about the opposing party's actions and intentions low, and
the likelihood of mistakes or misapprehensions minimal.135 Each of
the eight factors identified by Fortna implicates one or more of these
three categories.
With respect to raising the cost of war, the first four factors
36
increase the cost of attack by physically separating the parties.'
1. Separatingtroopsfrom the ceasefire line
Forcing troops to withdraw from the borders helps quell the
passions of territorial gains.' 37 Belligerents who fight to obtain
territory are reluctant to turn it over to the opposing
party, but mutual
38
concern.
this
diminish
to
help
can
withdrawal
2. Creatingdemilitarizedzones
In addition to reducing the likelihood of unintentional ceasefire
line trespasses, creating substantial demilitarized zones (DMZs) is
reassuring to post-conflict belligerents.' 39
The ability to see
opponents advancing before they arrive reduces anxiety. 140
3. Imposing arms control measures
Intuitively, restricting access to weapons makes mobilization less
4
probable and makes peace a more likely result.' '
4. Peacekeeping and third party guarantees
Placing third-party peacekeepers between fighting factions
42
physically constrains belligerents, making war more costly.
135. Id. at 21-24.

136. Id. at 21, 24-25.
137. See id. at 25.
138. See id. Supporting this contention, Fortna describes the U.N.'s attempt to
"make withdrawal to the status quo antebellum the norm by generally refusing to
recognize territorial gains through war." Id. Enforcing this norm diminishes the
incentive for a counter-attack to regain territory captured on the battlefield. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.

141.

Id.
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Whether armed soldiers or unarmed observers, third parties can
referee cease-fire compliance of post-conflict belligerents by
providing an unbiased presence between opposing parties, diminishing
the risk of miscommunication. 143 Additionally, third party bystanders
can alert the international media of their observations, threatening bad
publicity for parties violating the peace agreement. 44 Moreover, the
threat of force by third party peacekeepers
gives "teeth" to the
45
1
compliance.
ceasefire
of
monitoring
The four remaining factors of Fortna's second tier help reduce
uncertainty and minimize mistakes and misapprehensions.
5. Drafting ceasefire agreements with specificity
Specificity in the language of the ceasefire, especially with regard
to the location of the ceasefire line, is crucial to mutual understanding.
A well-written agreement can help to prevent relapse back into a
hostile situation. 146
6. Implementing confidence-building measures
Confidence-building measures are "mechanisms that regulate and
increase the transparency of military activities prone to produce
friction among adversaries." 147 These mechanisms can relieve anxiety
through, for example, requiring parties to notify each other in advance
of significant troop mobilization and by creating transparency in
48
parties' respective military facilities through joint inspections.
Confidence-building measures thus
promote effective communication
49
belligerents.1
would-be
between

142. Id. at 26.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 26-27.
145. See id. at 26. Indeed, some commentators maintain that armed
peacekeepers are crucial in civil war scenarios. Id. at 27 (citing Barbara F. Walter,
The CriticalBarrierto Civil War Settlement, 51 INT'L ORG. 335 (1997)).
146. Id. at 28.
147. Id. at 27.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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7. Establishingdispute resolutionprocedures
Particularly effective methods of dispute resolution include
negotiation, mediation, and the creation of mixed commissions which
allow the parties to work through conflicts that might arise in the
implementation of the peace agreement. 150 Using one of these
methods also sends5the signal, from each party to the other, that peace
efforts are sincere.'
8. Formalizing the agreement
Finally, a peace agreement is more effective when it is formally
signed in the international sphere.' 52 Similar to the deterrent effect of
third party observers who can report peace agreement noncompliance
to the international media, publicly signed peace agreements
discourage ceasefire violations by putting the post-conflict parties'
international reputations on the line.'53
III.

APPLYING THE DURABILITY SCHEMA TO SIERRA LEONE

While each of Sierra Leone's three major peace agreements failed
to secure durable peace, they help inform what more is required to
achieve this objective. Fortna's schema for durable peace provides
54
the framework for analyzing Sierra Leone's peace agreements.
This analysis helps identify the gaps needed to be filled to establish
resilient security and identify past causes for failure. Accordingly,
Fortna's two-tier schema will be applied to the Abidjan Accord, the
Conakry Peace Plan, and the Lom6 Peace Agreement.

150. Id. at 27-28.
151. Id. at 28.
152. Id. at 28-29.
153. Id.
154. While the durable peace schema offered by Fortna in Peace Time pertains
primarily to international conflict, it is also applicable to civil conflicts as evidenced
by the fact that more than a dozen references are made to "civil war" in the index.
Id. at 236. Fortna is authoring a book which focuses on the use of peacekeeping in
See Columbia University
civil conflicts specifically, which is forthcoming.
Bio, http://www.columbia.
Science Faculty
of Political
Department
edu/cu/polisci/fac-bios/fortna/faculty.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
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A. The Abidjan Accord
Applying the eight factors in the first tier of Fortna's schema, the
baselines for peace were so low in November 1996 that it is no
surprise that the Abidjan Accord could not bring lasting peace.
1. First Tier Analysis
First, the relative power of the RUF and the Sierra Leone
government were skewed at the signing of this peace agreement. This
is shown in two ways. As an initial matter, the timing is relevant; the
RUF signed the Abidjan Accord one month after it suffered major
losses on the battlefield vis-A-vis the privately run Executive
Outcomes. 155 The second example of the RUF's post-conflict lack of
bargaining power has to do with the RUF withdrawing an ultimatum
given to the Sierra Leone government. While the RUF previously
refused to negotiate with the Sierra Leone government without
Executive Outcomes withdrawing their troops from Sierra Leone first,
the RUF did just that by negotiating the terms of the Abidjan
Accord. 15 6 The Sierra Leone government's preponderance of power,
157
per Fortna, may have worked either for or against lasting peace.
Whether or not the RUF's comparably weaker status promoted or
discouraged the resumption of hostilities in the Sierra Leone conflict,
other situational factors did lead the RUF to resume hostilities soon
after reaching the settlement in the Abidjan Accord.
Second, the cost of war to the RUF is difficult to ascertain. While
Fortna speaks of the "costs of war" in terms of the great expense of
human casualties,158 a skeptic would be hard pressed to agree that the
RUF, a group that inflicted atrocious human rights violations upon
civilians and forced children to take up arms, had any respect for

155. The RUF lost its mining strongholds in October 1996, and Sankoh signed
the Abidjan Accord in November 1996. VOETEN, supra note 1, at 302.
156. See supra Part 1.
157. There is debate regarding whether a preponderance of power or a balance
of power between parties is more conducive to the parties reaching a cease-fire. See
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 82-83.
158. See id. at 79 ("[A]voiding the high cost of war, particularly in lives, is the
main incentive to cooperate.").
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human life or serious problems replenishing their ranks. 159 Indeed, the
economic costs of peace were greater than continuing with the violent
raiding of civilian towns-a practice which generated human and
60
material capital. 1
Third, at least three parties were involved in the conflict
immediately preceding the Abidjan Accord. These were (1) the
NPRC, who held control of the government by virtue of their military
coup; (2) Executive Outcomes, the hired guns charged with the task of
ejecting the RUF; and (3) the RUF. 16 1 In the years prior to this first
RUF peace agreement, the APC (ruling party that was ousted during a
military coup), and the ULIMO (the Liberian militia that assisted in
62
pushing the RUF back into Liberia in late 1991) were also involved.1
While five different parties were embroiled in the conflict leading up
to the Abidjan Accord, the only two parties to the peace agreement
63
itself were the Republic of Sierra Leone and the RUF.1
Fourth, the history of the military conflict between the Sierra
Leonean government and the RUF was five years of fighting at the
time the Abidjan Accord was signed. 164 Since five years comes up
short of being an "enduring rivalry" and this was the first attempted
159. See, e.g., GBERIE, supra note

65, at 148-51 (2005) (regarding conscription

of child soldiers); Weissman, supra note 2, at 55 (The RUF was responsible for
"looting and burning villages, attacking displaced persons' camps, amputating,
raping, and abducting or killing men, women and children.").
160. According to one commentator, one of the primary incentives for the RUF
to renege on the Abidjan Accord was "the economic benefits of warfare, benefits
that were usually far more substantial for commanders than for their often
impoverished followers." KEEN, supra note 11, at 193. Additionally, Fortna
indicates that "the availability of easily 'lootable' resources"-such as diamonds in
the RUF's case-is a critical factor to consider in determining the duration of peace
Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?
after civil war.
International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War, 48 INT'L

STUD. Q. 269, 275 (2004) [hereinafter Fortna, Peacekeeping].
161.

RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 17.

162. Id. at 12.
163. Other signatories included Henri Konan Bedie (President of the Republic
of Cote d'Ivoire), Berhanu Dinka (Special Envoy of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for Sierra Leone), Adwoa Coleman (Representative of the Organization of
African Unity, which is now known as the African Union), and Moses Anafu
(Representative of the Commonwealth Organization.) Abidjan Accord, supra note
13.
164. Id.
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peace agreement between the two parties, the Abidjan Accord was not
the repeated war-peace agreement scenario that Fortna identifies as
encouraging strong agreements. On the other hand, the history of the
conflict between the RUF and the government is longer when one
considers political activity instead of military activity. While the RUF
insurgence did not occur until 1991, the students who would become
the RUF's soldiers and leaders had been protesting what they
considered to be a corrupt Sierra Leone government since the
seventies. 16 5 RUF members' protracted ideological conflict with the
Sierra Leone government policies suggests that the parties should be
more willing to draft a strong agreement.
Fifth, both the RUF and the Sierra Leone government had high
stakes in the conflict. Some of the RUF's stakes in the conflict were
philosophical in nature. Before growing militant under the training of
Charles Taylor, 66 the disgruntled students who became RUF
members had a salient political message-they were dissatisfied with
APC government corruption, the elite's exploitation of Sierra Leone's
67
military wealth, and the inaccessibility of the urban economy.
While this message became less clear as the group became more
violent into the nineties, the philosophical beliefs remained at the core
of the RUF's very existence. 16 8 There were also economic stakes to
169
the RUF's political and ideological agenda. As stated previously,
the RUF had significant economic interests in continued warfare
against the government. 70 The illicit diamond trade was crucial to
fund the RUF itself.17' The government of Sierra Leone certainly had
stakes in the conflict with the RUF as well. The RUF's ceaseless
raids, senseless murders, and attempts to take over the capital taxed
165. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 35, at 174.
166. Weissman, supra note 2, at 45.
167. Id. at 43-44.
168. Id. at 44.
169. See discussion of costs of war under the "Abidjan Agreement" portion of
the analysis section, supra Part II.A.1.
170. KEEN, supra note 11, at 193.
171. One scholar notes that there is symbolic value to the RUF's economic
reliance on diamonds, since diamonds are a "[]symbol of the elite that had caused
great misery and had instituted the new 'Black Colonialism."' Ian Martinez, Article,
Sierra Leone's "Conflict Diamonds": The Legacy of Imperial Mining Laws and
Policy, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. (SPECIAL IssUE) 217, 239 (2001-2002).
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the nation's purse as well as its population. The government's
economic stakes in the conflict were also evidenced by the significant
expenditure on Executive Outcomes, the private military firm that was
72
hired to help fend off the rebels. 1
Under Fortna's rationale, peace between Sierra Leone's
government and its rebels may not have even been an option because
the stakes for both parties were considerably high. Fortna states that
when prospective gains or losses associated with attack are extremely
high (such as the very existence of a state), stakes may be high enough
to make conciliation impossible. 173 The RUF's very existence
depended on violent raids and mining territory takeovers for funding;
similarly, Sierra Leone's political stability depended on incapacitating
the rebels who were always threatening a coup. In essence, the stakes
reached the level where the parties' very existence was at risk, which
may help to explain why the Abidjan Accord never had a fighting
chance.
Sixth, territory dispute was at the heart of the conflict in Sierra
Leone. As mentioned under the prior factor, the RUF depended on
control of mining territories to use the revenue from diamond sales to
fund its rebel army. 174 This hunger for land, as predicted by Fortna,
made durable peace difficult because the RUF had every incentive to
renege on the Abidjan Accord and attempt to regain their territory.
Ironically, losing control of these territories seems to have been the
RUF's motivation to go to the bargaining table in the first place, since
they agreed to bargain a month after losing the territory.
Seventh, geographic contiguity does not exactly apply to the
Sierra Leone conflict since it is, for the most part, a war within and not
across borders. However, Fortna's notion that physical proximity
lowers the costs of renewed violence seems to hold true nonetheless.
Even though, at times, the RUF was pushed out of Sierra Leone and
into Liberia, the RUF members and the seat of the Sierra Leone
government were precariously close at the time of the ceasefire,
weakening an already fragile state of peace.

172. RICHARDS, supra note 3, at 17; Weissman, supra note 2, at 47-48.
173. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 81.
174. See CAMPBELL, supra note 65, at 63 ("Because of their diamond wealth,
throughout most of the war the RUF was better armed than its adversaries.").
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Eighth, the relative capabilities at the time of ceasefire weighed in
the capital's favor. Executive Outcomes stripped the RUF of its grasp
on key military bases in October 1996;.. 5 over RUF protests, the
private security brigade remained in Sierra Leone in November 1996,
at the time of negotiation. 7 6 Just prior to drafting the peace
77
agreement, the RUF lacked both resources and bargaining power.'
Since Fortna concluded that developments in relative capabilities over
time dictate the baselines for peace, the sudden shift in power that
accompanied the RUF losing its diamond strongholds
in October
78
works against the likelihood of durable peace. 1
2. Second Tier Analysis
Bearing in mind Sierra Leone's baselines for peace as revealed
under the first tier of Fortna's schema, it is now time to explore how
the Abidjan Accord fares under the second tier of factors.
First, the Abidjan Accord did not require mutual withdrawal of79
troops. Instead, it featured articles calling for RUF encampment.'
Abidjan established and charged a Demobilization and Settlement
Commission with the responsibility of initiating resettlement of these
RUF occupants within one month after the signing of the
agreement.180 Since government forces still held control of former

RUF strongholds, it was as though the Abidjan Accord obligated
unilateral (RUF-only) troop withdrawal from the battlefield rather
than mutuality. The failure to include a mutual withdrawal provision
is a failure to "raise[] the cost of attack and alleviate[] fear.' 18' Thus,
the lack of mutuality in troop removal from the battlefield, which
allowed for government troops to continue to occupy disputed land,
175. VOETEN, supra note 1, at 302.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. However, Fortna indicates that the causal relationship between changes in
relative capabilities and resumption of war is unclear. That is, Fortna's tests do not
demonstrate "whether shifts in capabilities lead to the breakdown of peace, or
whether the start of a new war leads to shifts in capabilities." FORTNA, supra note
25, at 106, 113.
179. Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, arts. 5-8.
180. Id. art. 7.
181. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25.
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likely increased RUF anxiety and, by extension, the likelihood of
future hostilities.
Second, the Abidjan Accord did create demilitarized zones.
Under Article 5:
The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry
into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and
reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter. The upkeep and
welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary
responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction
with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by
the international community. 182
Thus, if enforced, the creation of specific demilitarized assembly
zones could pacify the belligerents by reassuring them that, at a
minimum, they would be able to witness an attack before it was upon
them.183
Third, the Abidjan Accord contained arms control measures.' 84 In
addition to Article 5, quoted above, Articles 6 through 8 had
provisions for disarmament.
Article 6 announced a national
commitment to disarmament made effective by the Demobilization
and Resettlement Committee "in coordination with all the relevant
institutions and agencies." Further, Article 7 required identification of
the assembly camps where RUF members were to be disarmed.
Finally, Article 8 requested international aid to supervise and monitor
"the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration"
process.' 85 These arms control measures, applied to both parties,
further the goal of reducing the possibility of future violence. While it
is curious that the encampment procedures apply to the RUF only,
insofar as it reduces the threat of violence as a practical matter, RUF
encampment advances the peace objective.
Fourth, the Abidjan Accord provided for third party peacekeeping.
In addition to Article 8's disarmament requirements, it also called for
the Joint Monitoring Group to observe those processes.' 86 Pursuant to
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, art. 5.
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25.
Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, arts. 5-8.
Id. arts. 6-8.
Id. art. 8.
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this article, 720 U.N. peacekeeping troops and sixty observers were
anticipated when it came time to implement the agreement.' 8 7 RUF
leader Sankoh preferred zero peacekeeping troops and sixty
observers. 88 Understandably, this was read as a manifestation of the
RUF's intention to violate the Abidjan Accord and disrupt the brief
89
peace that its signing brought.'
Fifth, the Abidjan Accord was not drafted with specificity. One
critical ambiguity which was touched on in the prior factor relates to
the provision of peacekeeping forces. After both parties signed the
peace agreement, there was disagreement about the number of
peacekeepers that would be used. 190 This misunderstanding could
have been resolved by specifying the number of peacekeepers to be
Additionally, Article 8 fails to indicate that the
deployed.
peacekeepers would be U.N. blue helmets. 19 ' The use of U.N.
for Sankoh,
peacekeepers could likely have been the deal ' breaker
92
UN."'
the
of
suspicious
since he "was perennially
A second crucial ambiguity in the language of the Abidjan Accord
concerns the integration of the RUF into Sierra Leone society. Three
articles of the agreement and the annex contain vague mentions of
93
how RUF combatants will be "reintegrated" into public society.
Exactly how reintegration would be achieved, however, is hard to
determine within the four corners of the document. The possibility for
misunderstanding that this ambiguity creates is critical; RUF member
inclusion (such as opportunities to participate in the urban economy)
was of paramount concern for the rebels since the outset of the
conflict. 94 The unfulfilled promise of these "reintegration" articles,

187. KEEN, supra note 11, at 194.
188. Id.
189. See id. ("If Sankoh and the RUF leadership had genuinely desired

peace...
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

they would surely have asked for more, not fewer, peacekeepers.").
Id. at 194.
Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, art. 8.
KEEN, supra note 11, at 194 n.5.
Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, arts. 5, 8, 14, annex.
Weissman, supra note 2, at 43.
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from the perspective of the RUF, constituted a breach that destroyed
195
RUF trust in the Abidjan Accord.
96
Sixth, the Abidjan Accord omits confidence-building measures.'
If included, according to Fortna, such measures would help to promote
mutual understanding and increase confidence between belligerents.
Such measures could include notifying the opposing party prior to
97
moving troops and completing joint military facilities inspections.'
Seventh, the Abidjan Accord does include dispute resolution
procedures.198
Such procedures could assist belligerents in
communicating to the other party that each is sincere about addressing
the problems the conflict created and healing from the conflict's
wounds. Accordingly, Article 15 provides:
The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and
Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with
the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to
undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education

aimed at enhancing national unity and reconciliation, taking199
into
account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.
As Fortna notes, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions can be
particularly effective dispute resolution mechanisms. 200 However, the
parties here did not take the opportunity to establish such a tribunal
when they could have done so under Article 15.20 1 As a result, they
passed up an opportunity to heal.202
Eighth, the parties formally signed the Abidjan Accord in the
international sphere, evidenced by the fact that members of the
195. The RUF broadcast an "Apology to the Nation" which alleged that
Kabbah's Sierra Leone People's Party had divided and ostracized the RUF violating
its promises to integrate. KEEN, supra note 11, at 197.
196. See Abidjan Accord, supra note 13.
197. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 27.
198.

See Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, art. 15.

199. Id.
200.

See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 28.

201. Sierra Leone eventually created a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
under the Lomd Peace Agreement pursuant to an Act of Parliament passed on
February 10, 2000. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone
(Apr. 8, 2003), http://www.sierra-leone.org//trc-trcforsierraleone.html.
202. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 28.
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international community were signatories to the peace agreement
itself.20 3 Furthermore, the signing of the Abidjan Accord was reported
in the international media.20 4 This exposure, consequently, provided
an added deterrent to the noncompliance with the agreement: the
threat of losing face in the international sphere.20 5
3. Findings
In sum, the low baselines for peace dictated by the situational
factors created a political climate that would make it difficult for any
agreement to survive. The RUF had everything to gain and nothing to
lose by breaking the ceasefire.2 °6 Additionally, the peace agreement
itself could have been stronger. When the Abidjan Accord was
adopted, the fatal error was the lack of specificity regarding U.N.
peacekeepers. Since the leader of the RUF, Sankoh, was so unwilling
to work with the United Nations, the peacekeeper aspect of the
agreement became the deal-breaker for the RUF leadership and the
Abidjan Accord barely lasted a year.20 7 Had the parties taken
advantage of other opportunities, such as incorporating into the
agreement provisions for mutual troop withdrawal from the ceasefire
line or confidence-building measures, the agreement might have held
the peace for a longer period of time. These two aspects were
especially crucial for this particular agreement since territorial
disputes arising from the government's recapture of RUF strongholds
rendered the topics of land control and troop movement delicate issues

203.

Other signatories included Henri Konan Bedie (President of the Republic

of Cote d'Ivoire), Berhanu Dinka (Special Envoy of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral for Sierra Leone), Adwoa Coleman (Representative of the Organization of
African Unity, which is now known as the African Union), and Moses Anafu
(Representative of the Commonwealth Organization). Abidjan Accord, supra note
13.
204. See, e.g., U.N. PRESS RELEASE SG/SM/6612: SECRETARY-GENERAL
PLEASED BY AGREEMENT IN SIERRA LEONE, CALLS FOR GOOD FAITH
http://www.un.orgfNews/Press/docs/1996/
IMPLEMENTATION,
available
at
19961121.sgsm6l12.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
205. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26-27.
206. See GBERIE, supra note 65, at 12.
207. See supra Part I.C.
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at the time the Abidjan Accord was negotiated.2 °8 Thus, the low
baselines for peace, coupled with a lackluster peace agreement, led to
the Abidjan Accord's failure.
B. The Conakry Peace Plan
In analyzing the Conakry Peace Plan under the first tier of
Fortna's schema, this subpart examines how the four following factors
set the pre-agreement baseline for peace: military outcome of war,
number of parties involved, territory disputes, and relative capabilities
at the time of ceasefire. The Conakry Peace Plan is not analyzed here
under the other four factors in the first tier (costs of war, historical
context and past conflicts, the stakes of the parties, and geographic
contiguity) since this analysis is identical to the analysis of the
Abidjan Accord, supra.
1. First Tier Analysis
First, the military outcome of the war preceding the adoption of
the Conakry Peace Plan was the decisive victory of the RUF-backed
Sierra Leone Army military coup. 20 9 Kabbah fled the country, and
international intervention became necessary to remove the military
junta.2 0 It was only after the imposition of military and economic
sanctions from the United Nations, ECOMOG, the European Union,
and Great Britain that the AFRC/RUF agreed to negotiate a peace
agreement. 211 And though the AFRC/RUF had less bargaining power
at Conakry than ECOWAS (indeed, the full name of the agreement is
"ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone"), the AFRC/RUF
were the clear victors vis-A-vis Sierra Leone's Kabbah regime. 212 It

208. Fortna notes that restoring territory control to the boundaries that existed
before the war, rather than recognizing property gained by belligerents in the course
of war, is particularly effective in decreasing the likelihood of additional attacks
when coupled with mutual troop withdrawal. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25. This is
due to the fact these two tactics diminish the parties' uncertainty as to territorial
control after the ceasefire. Id.
209. GBERIE, supra note 63, at 97-117.
210. See KEEN, supra note 11, at 208-18.
211. Id. at212-15.

212. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14.
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was the international pressure from ECOWAS and other non-Sierra
Leone-based entities that put the military junta in the role of the
21 3
"defeated" party, making the prospect of a ceasefire more desirable.
Second, three parties were involved in the military coup, which
was the impetus for the Conakry Peace Plan: the defecting Sierra
Leone Army soldiers, the RUF, and the Kamajors who defended
Kabbah's regime. 2 14 Kabbah, who did not trust the government
soldiers, replaced Executive Outcomes with Kamajors (traditional
hunters who Kabbah had organized into militias) in January 1997.215
Applying Fortna's statistical conclusions on the matter, the fact that
the coup was a multilateral conflict rather than a bilateral conflict
seems not to affect the likelihood of peace one way or the other.21 6
Third, the only territorial dispute in the conflict between the
military junta and Kabbah's administration was which regime had
control of the capital. While the military junta occupied the Freetown
territory in more of a political rather than physical manner, this
dispute added tension to the peace agreement negotiation process.2 17
Fourth, the relative capabilities at the time of the ceasefire are
hard to determine. Kabbah's international backing after the military
coup makes it hard to separate the relative capabilities of the
AFRC/RUF military junta on the one hand and the Kabbah-led SLPP
on the other. 2 18 However, the developing relative capabilities of the
RUF seem to be significant here since this was the second peace

213. Fortna suggests that when there is a clear winner in a conflict, the
See FORTNA,
supra note 25, at 77-78.
214. This brigade of kamajors is also referred to as the Civil Defense Force.
See Williams, supra note 5, at 274.
215. Weissman, supra note 2, at 48.
216. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 212; see also supra note 121 text.
217. See KEEN, supra note 11, at 212-18.
218. Id. at 212-13. International disapproval of military coup d'etats aligned
foreign governments, regional institutions and international organizations with
Kabbah and his ousted government. Id. This AFRC/RUF disapproval was made
manifest in the form of Nigerian soldiers attempting a counter-coup, the United
Kingdom suspending foreign aid programs, the European Union suspending
development aid programs, and U.N. sanctions. Id. Although the AFRC/RUF
regime had more power relative to Kabbah's ousted SLPP party, the AFRC/RUF
had less power than Kabbah's regime when combined with international support.
defeated party, if rational, will opt not to fight the unwinnable war.
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agreement within a relatively short period of time.2 19 This may be a
manifestation of the
RUF's sincere willingness to create a strong
220
peace agreement.
2. Second Tier Analysis
As a preliminary matter, the Conakry Peace Plan is a
comparatively sparse, eight-point peace plan with a minimal preamble
and a functional quality.221 Analysis of the Conakry Peace Plan's
contents under the second tier of factors, comprising Fortna's durable
peace schema, reflects its inherent functionality.
First, the Conakry Peace Plan does not have a provision for the
mutual withdrawal of troops from the ceasefire line.2 2 Similar to the
Abidjan Accord before it, this second peace agreement does not
provide the buffer that, according to Fortna, can help to resolve the
anxieties associated with territorial gains.223
Second, the Conakry Peace Plan creates demilitarized zones
(DMZs).224 The second article of the Conakry Peace Plan indicates
that "[c]ombatants will be directed to report at designated centres in
order to be engaged in the disarmament process. "225 While it does not
accomplish this in the way suggested by Fortna-placing DMZs
between combatants to act as a buffer and quell anxieties of a
219. Fortna indicates that developing relative capabilities as evidenced by
more than one agreement between the same parties can promote the likelihood of
durable peace. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 212.
220. See id.
221. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14.
222. See id.
223. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25.
224. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, art. 2:
It is considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct
an effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. This should
take place from 1 to 31 December, 1997.
Given the nation-wide
dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and
uncomplicated procedure is envisaged. Combatants will be directed to
report at designated centres in order to be engaged in the disarmament
process. ECOMOG will supervise the entire process of disarmament and
demobilisation. Where necessary, incentives may have to be provided to
encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.
225. Id.
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subsequent attack 226-that the DMZs were created at all arguably
diminishes the belligerents' respective anxieties.
Third, the Conakry Peace Plan employs arms control measures.2 2 7
Article 2, quoted in part above, provides that beginning December 1
and ending December 31, combatants will be disarmed and
demobilized at specified locations.22 8 Removing violent weapons in
this way, per Fortna, is a move in favor of peace.
Fourth, the Conakry Peace Plan features several peacekeeping
provisions and third-party guarantees. Examples include Article 1,
under which the U.N. and ECOMOG share responsibility for
supervising the ceasefire; 229 Article 2, which charges ECOMOG with
the responsibility
of supervising
both disarmament
and
demobilization; 230 and Article 3, which makes both ECOMOG and
U.N. military observers responsible for humanitarian assistance.23
While U.N. and ECOMOG peacekeeping forces help to increase the
cost of war, as identified by Fortna,23 2 ECOMOG is neither a "third
party" nor unbiased.2 3 3 The fact that the AFRC/RUF military junta
was engaged in hostilities with ECOMOG prior to the signing of the
Conakry Peace Plan, coupled with the fact that the agreement itself is
quintessentially an ECOWAS decree, creates a conflict of interest
when ECOMOG is charged with the responsibility of "third party"
peacekeeping. 2 34 That is, it seems neither appropriate nor logical that
ECOMOG, an entity that has been a major player in the Sierra Leone
conflict, could serve as participant and referee at the same time.23 5

226. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25.
227. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, art. 2.
228. Id.
229. Id. art. 1.
230. Id. art. 2.
231. Id. art. 3.
232. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26.
233. An estimated 14,000 ECOMOG soldiers fought alongside civilian
kamajor forces against the AFRC/RUF military junta. KEEN, supra note 11, at 212.
234. See id.at 212-13.
235. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26. Peacekeepers cannot effectively
mediate a conflict to which they are a party. Id. ("[P]eacekeepers also serve a
monitoring function . . .to act as a referee, adjudicating 'who started it' when
clashes occur. In practice, monitors and armed peacekeepers often serve an
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ECOMOG's bias and lack of third party status undercuts the possible
236
effectiveness of having peacekeepers and third party guarantees.
Nor were the U.N. troops a perfectly neutral peacekeeping
force.2 3 7 By intervening after public condemnation of the AFRC/RUF
238
military coup, the U.N. sided with the Sierra Leone government.
Furthermore, President Kabbah's curriculum vitae speaks for itself.
Kabbah served as a U.N. official for more than two decades, working
with the U.N. Development Programme in various locations before
returning to Sierra Leone in 1992.239 Given Kabbah's past affiliation
with the U.N., it is conceivable that any U.N. involvement in the
resolution of the Sierra Leone conflict was suspect of being proKabbah in nature in the eyes of the military junta.24°
Fifth, the authors of the Conakry Peace Plan drafted the peace
agreement with adequate specificity. Seeming to have learned from
the mistakes of the Abidjan Accord, the entities providing
peacekeepers under the agreement are explicitly named: the U.N. and
ECOMOG.24' This full disclosure eliminates the possibility of
quibbling over troops after the fact, a problem with the Abidjan
Accord (addressed previously).242
The Conakry Peace Plan also seems to take a lesson from Abidjan
in the way it provides specific plans to reintegrate the RUF. Under
article six, titled "Reintegration of Combatants,"
important dispute resolution function, mediating small quarrels and clashes on the
spot.").
236. See id.
237. "Sankoh rebuffed the [U.N. Planning] team's proposal for a 750-strong
(emphasis
peacekeeping force, declaring the UN as not being impartial.....
added). Hirsch, supra note 8, at 524.
238. Samuels, supra note 65, at 330.
239. Country Profiles, Sierra Leone Leaders, BBC, Aug. 11,
See
country-profiles/1061561.stm.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
Weissman, supra note 2, at 61-62.

2007,
also

240. The same might be said regarding the partiality of British peacekeeping
forces, intervening in their own right in 2000. GBERIE, supra note 63, at 173. In
addition to having served as a U.N. official, Kabbah also was a political official with
the British government. See Country Profiles, Sierra Leone, supra note 239.

Educated in Britain, Kabbah came to serve as a district commissioner for the British
government while Sierra Leone was still under British colonial rule. Id.
241. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, arts. 1-3.
242. See supra Part III.A.
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All those who disarm as a result of the implementation of the peace
process, should be provided with either job training to fit them for
alternative employment or given scholarships and grants for further
education. Access to education at all levels should be made
available to all demobilised persons. Ex-combatants should be
provided with assistance to facilitate their re-integration into their
communities. We strongly appeal to the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and
indeed the international community to render appropriate assistance
243
to achieve this objective.

A provision of this nature promotes durable peace. This detailed
reintegration clause discourages RUF members from resuming
hostilities because they cannot argue integration was inadequately
addressed, an RUF complaint with the Abidjan Accord.244 By drafting
the reintegration and peacekeeping provisions with precision, the
authors of the Conakry Peace Plan promoted compliance with this
245
second peace agreement.
Sixth, the bare-bones Conakry Peace Plan does not implement
confidence-building measures. While there is a provision giving
notice to the parties that returning refugees will be assisted, there is no
provision giving notice to the parties of troop movement.246 In this
sense, the peace agreement helps to foster mutual understanding
between both parties since article four notifies the belligerents that
refugees might be crossing the borders back into Sierra Leone.24 7
Seventh, the Conakry Peace Plan does not provide dispute
resolution procedures. Instead, it has an amnesty provision granting
all combatants immunity from prosecution for the crimes committed
on May 25, 1997.248

Fortna would say that the lack of dispute

resolution provisions ignores the value of these procedures, which can
assist in building a historical record of atrocities committed in the
course of conflict and expresses mutual peaceful intentions. 249 The
243. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, art. 6.
KEEN, supra note 11, at 197.
245. Fortna suggests that peace agreements which are written with specificity
promote durable peace. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 28.
246. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, art. 4.
247. Id.
248. Id. art. 8.
249. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 28.
244.
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establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission under the
Lom6 Peace Agreement may be viewed as an acknowledgement of
this deficiency in the Conakry Peace Plan.25°
Eighth, the Conakry Peace Plan was a formally signed agreement.
Admittedly, the agreement was enacted for ECOWAS, a regional
organization in West Africa. 251' However, the Conakry Peace Plan still
received publicity beyond the West African region as a result of
international media coverage 25 2 and by virtue of its international
signatories: witnesses Professor Ibrahima Fall, Assistant SecretaryGeneral of the U.N., and Ms. Adwoa Coleman, Representative of the
Organization of African Unity. 253
3. Findings
In conclusion, the Conakry Peace Plan was flawed because it
employed enforcement mechanisms sparingly and it called for
peacekeeping forces that were not neutral.254 Additionally, the
Conakry Peace Plan did not employ useful tactics like mutual troop
withdrawal, 255 which would have added reciprocal confidence to the
peacebuilding process. 25 6 The presence of confidence-building terms
may have dissuaded the AFRC/RUF junta from attacking the Sierra
Leone government, an attack which was planned almost immediately
after government power changed hands back to Kabbah.257
Additionally, the Conakry Peace Plan's enforcement mechanisms
In terms of enforcing the peace
were dictated by ECOWAS.
agreement, the fact that ECOWAS was a party to the conflict made
the entity an undesirable resource for peacekeeping troops from the
perspective of the junta. This was detrimental to the peace agreement
250. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, arts. VI, XXVI.
251. Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14.
252. See, e.g., Sierra Leone, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 24, 1997, at 9; Junta Set to
Restore Sierra Leone Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A14.

253. Id.
254. Fortna underscores the importance of neutral peacekeeping forces. See
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 23 ("However, neutral referees can play an important role
in fostering durable peace.").
255. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14.

256. See
257.

FORTNA,

supra note 25, at 25.

KEEN, supra note 11, at 216.
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because, as Fortna identifies, peacekeepers are the linchpin of
promoting peace after civil conflicts.2 5 8 Another shortcoming of
ECOMOG's active role in both the Sierra Leone civil war, and peace
efforts to end the civil war, is that the conflict of interest may well
have inspired mistrust in the RUF. This works against the goal of
promoting trust through the communication of benign intent between
the parties, a value that cuts across many of Fortna's
recommendations. 259 Thus, it comes as no surprise that hostilities
resumed within a few short months of the adoption of the Conakry
Peace Plan.2 6 °
C. The Lom Peace Agreement
Similar to the "baselines for peace" analysis of the Conakry Peace
Plan, the analysis of the Lom6 Peace Agreement will only involve
four of eight factors set forth in the Fortna's first tier: the military
outcome of war, number of parties involved, territory disputes, and
relative capabilities at the time of ceasefire. In the interest of avoiding
repetition, please refer to the sub-part analyzing the Abidjan Accord
for discussion of costs of war, historical context and past conflicts, the
26 1
stakes of the parties, and geographic contiguity.
1. First Tier Analysis
First, the military outcome of the AFRC/RUF's 1999
counterattack favored the military junta, who had no qualms about
existing conditions, since they held a significant amount of power at

258. See Fortna, Peacekeeping, supra note 160, at 288 ("Peacekeeping works,
particularly after the Cold War when most of the attempts to keep peace after civil
wars have been made. The presence of international personnel is not the silver
bullet, of course, it does not guarantee peace in every case, but it does make peace
more likely to last, and to last longer.") (emphasis added).
259. As Fortna states under a heading titled Reducing Uncertainty About
Actions and Intentions, in working towards durable peace, "the involvement of
outsiders... serve[s] as [an] important signaling device[]. Talk alone may not allay
fears and mistrust." FORTNA, supra note 25, at 22.
260. VOETEN, supra note 1, at 303.
261. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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the time Lom6 was being negotiated.262 While it is true that
ECOMOG managed to remove the military junta from Freetown and
restore power to Kabbah in 1997, the RUF managed to regain control
of different regions in Sierra Leone in the year that followed.26 3 In
subsequent counterattacks, the RUF, accompanied by the AFRC,
regained control of Freetown-if only for a few short days-and some
bygone mining-territory strongholds as well.26 4 This would suggest
that the military junta had little incentive to negotiate a peace
agreement. However, Kabbah, the defeated party, was not rushing to
the negotiating table either.265 One scholar suggests that it was the
influence of the U.S. State Department, which did not want to
continue assisting ECOMOG in fighting the rebel/ex-soldier duo, that
266
made peace talks between Kabbah and Sankoh resume again.
Nonetheless, both parties begrudgingly agreed to meet to negotiate the
Lomd Peace Agreement.
Second, four parties were involved in the conflict preceding the
Lom6 Peace Agreement. These included the AFRC and the RUF on
one side, and the Civil Defense Force (or kamajors, who had replaced
Executive Outcomes) and ECOMOG on the other.267 Since each of
these four parties was paired up with another military entity, the
conflict was quasi-bilateral in the sense that it comprised the military
junta on the one side (AFRC and the RUF), and Kabbah loyalists on
the other (Civil Defense Force and ECOMOG). Since Fortna did not
conclude whether bilateral or multilateral conflicts were more
predisposed to negotiating durable peace agreements, the nature of the
conflict under this factor does not reveal much about the efficacy of
the Lom6 Peace Agreement.
262. Sankoh, on the other hand, had very little bargaining power in his
individual capacity since he had recently been sentenced to death. He was released
from prison to take part in yet another peace negotiation. KEEN, supra note 11, at
251. "Despite their ejection from Freetown, RUF/AFRC forces were continuing to
dominate many areas of Sierra Leone, particularly in the north and east, and Liberia
was still providing strong support." Id.
263. Williams, supra note 5, at 274.
264. Id. at 274-75.
265. KEEN, supra note 11, at 251.
266.

See id. at 250-51.

267. Id. at 216. The kamajors were allied against the RUF.
Muana, supra note 35, at 186.
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2007

Abdullah &

43

Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 11
160 California
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
[Vol. 38

Third, the Sierra Leone conflict involved an issue of disputed
territory. Similar to the situation that existed before the Abidjan
Accord was executed, strategic mining territories were contested
properties. (Accordingly, please refer to the discussion of this factor
under the analysis of the Abidjan Accord in this section.) Another
disputed territory on July 7, 1999, was Freetown. This is similar to
the circumstances preceding the adoption of the Conakry Peace Plan,
in that political and physical control of the capital city was being
disputed. (Accordingly, please refer to the discussion of this factor
under the analysis of the Conakry Peace Plan in this section.)
Fourth, the relative capabilities at the time of ceasefire were fairly
equal. Since Sankoh and Kabbah had dealt with each other before,
their past peace agreements and subsequent experiences made it clear
to both parties how their relative capabilities had fluctuated over time.
Per Fortna, these past attempts suggest that both parties were earnest
about applying their best efforts to a new peace initiative since they
had endeavored in the past to reach settlement. 26 8 Their earnest
attempt to achieve peace is reflected in the Lom6 Agreement itself,
which is far more comprehensive than any prior Sierra Leone peace
agreement.
2. Second Tier Analysis
First, the Lom6 Peace Agreement does not obligate all parties to
the conflict to withdraw their troops to the ceasefire line. However,
unilateral withdrawal of "all mercenaries" is provided for in article
18.269 This unilateral withdrawal provision likely reduces the anxiety
of RUF members concerned about Executive Outcomes.
Second, the Lom6 Peace Agreement does not explicitly provide
for demilitarized zones. 270 Thus, the Lom6 Peace Agreement (under
Fortna's analysis) is not as effective as it could be.2 7 '
268. One of Fortna's key assumptions is that parties are not fighting for
fighting's sake. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 10-11. Having attempted to negotiate
peace by signing the Abidjan Accord and Conakry Peace Plan rather than blowing
off reconciliation efforts, it is likely that the parties "want to settle their disputes
without resorting to war if they can" as Fortna assumes. Id. at 11.
269. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. XVIII.
270. See Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15.
271. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 25.
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Third, several articles of the Lomd Peace Agreement provide for
disarmament reducing the likelihood that violent conflict between the
military junta and Kabbah loyalists will resume. These articles pertain
to disarmament in the context of maintaining the security of
peacekeepers specifically, as well as "encampment, disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration" generally. 272 All these duties are to
be the task of UNOMSIL, the United Nations Observer Mission in
Sierra Leone.2 7 3

Fourth, building on the legacy of both the Abidjan Accord and the
Conakry Peace Plan, the Lom6 Peace Agreement has very specific
provisions pertaining to the role and identity of third party
peacekeepers at Articles II, III and VI. 274 This suggests that the
parties knew what type of peacekeepers they were agreeing to at the
outset, which was not the case with respect to the Abidjan Accord.275
Fifth, the Lom6 Peace Agreement is specific. While this is a
positive attribute that Lom6 shares with the Conakry Peace Plan, the
Lom6 Peace Agreement is superior to Conakry in that it is far more
extensive, specific, and detailed.276 It should come as no surprise,

272. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, arts. XV-XVI.
273. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was
in charge of peacekeeping, disarmament, demobilization of combatants, and
monitoring from July 1998 until October 1999, when it was replaced by a more
substantial peacekeeping operation: the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL). Completed Peacekeeping Operations, Sierra Leone, http://www.
un.org/ Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/Unomsil.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
274. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, arts. II, III, & VI.
275. The article in the Abidjan Accord pertaining to peacekeeping operations
did not specify who would be in charge of this operations, and this was a source of
dispute between the parties after the agreement was signed. Abidjan Accord, supra
note 13, art. 8; KEEN, supra note 11, at 194.
276. While the Conakry Peace Plan is comprised of only eight brief articles,
the Lom6 Peace Agreement consists of thirty-seven articles. Compare Conakry
Peace Plan, supra note 14, with Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15. As an
illustration of the Lom6 Peace Agreement's superior attention to detail in addressing
peace prospects, consider the relative extent to which each treaty addresses the RUF
reintegration issue. Article 6 of the Conakry agreement ambiguously indicates that
RUF members will enjoy "re-integration into their communities," whereas Articles
Ill-V of the Lom6 Agreement, describe in detail how RUF members will be
recognized as members of a valid RUF political party, eligible for public office, and
qualified for cabinet appointment. Id.
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then, that the Lom6 agreement has proven to be the most lasting and
effective of all of Sierra Leone's peace agreements.
Sixth, like its earlier counterparts, the Lom6 Peace Agreement
lacks confidence-building measures. Consequently, it is not as
effective as it could be.2 77
Seventh, the Lom6 Peace Agreement and the agreements
supplementing it establish dispute resolution procedures.
For
example, Article VI creates a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC). 278 Additionally, Article VIII establishes a Council of Elders
and Religious Leaders whose members are appointed by both the RUF
and the Sierra Leonean government to resolve conflicts.279
Conversely, another provision in the Lom6 agreement confers
amnesty upon all perpetrators of crimes committed in the course of the
Sierra Leone civil war. 280 This amnesty undermines other dispute
resolution mechanisms provided for in the peace agreement because it
signals a desire to forget the crimes that took place rather than address
the problems between the parties. 28' The amnesty provision proved
even more controversial when subsequently created dispute resolution
procedures conflicted with it. For example, the Agreement on the
Establishment of the Special Court in Sierra Leone created an ad hoc
tribunal charged with punishing the very individuals who were
apparently granted amnesty under Lom6. 2 82 Much has been written

regarding the conflict between the Special Court's mission and
Lom6's amnesty provision, as well as the international law issues
raised by the contradiction of excusing crimes through amnesty in one

277. Fortna indicates that confidence-building measures are crucial to
"increase[ing] the transparency of military activities prone to produce friction
among adversaries." FORTNA, supra note 25, at 27.
278. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. XXVI.
279. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. VIII.
280. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. IX.
281. Fortna emphasizes that the value in the dispute resolution procedures is
that they promote communication and mutual understanding between parties. See
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 28. Amnesty short-circuits the potential opportunity to
discuss conflict and learn from past problems, since it forgives past crimes instead of
addressing them with adjudication.
282. Williams, supra note 5, at 271.
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agreement, and punishing these crimes in another agreement. 283 As
illustrated by the criticism by legal commentators of the amnesty
provision, 2884 under Fortna's schema, the amnesty provision is a step
away from durable peace as it impairs dispute resolution
procedures.285
Eighth, the Lom6 Peace Agreement was signed in a manner more
formalized and publicized than its predecessors. Aside from President
Kabbah and Sankoh (representing the Republic of Sierra Leone and
the RUF, respectively), ten additional individuals from the
international community signed.286 Additionally, the Lom6 Peace
Agreement featured two articles devoted to its publication,
registration, and entry into force.287
3. Findings
In conclusion, the Lom6 Peace Agreement is Sierra Leone's most
comprehensive peace agreement yet. However, it is not complete.
Given the necessity of subsequent agreements to the fill the holes in
Lom6, such as the agreement establishing the Special Court, 288 it is
clear that the Lom6 Peace Agreement simply cannot establish durable

283. See, e.g., Macaluso, supra note 16; Sriram, supra note 101; Williams,
supra note 5; Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9.
284. See, e.g., Macaluso, supra note 16; Sriram, supra note 101; Williams,
supra note 5; Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9.

285. Fortna indicates that the value of dispute resolution procedures is that
"they serve as an ongoing signal of the intention to keep peace." FORTNA, supra
note 25, at 28. An amnesty provision, conversely, might send the message that
crimes committed in the course of civil war will be forgiven, thus jeopardizing the
maintenance of peace.
286. These signatures came from foreign diplomats, U.N. officials, and
regional organization representatives. Lomd Peace Agreement, supra note 15.
287. Article XXXVI even delineated the date that the Lom6 Peace Agreement
would be handed over to parliament, as well as the name of the periodical which
would publish the agreement for public dissemination. Lomd Peace Agreement,
supra note 15, art. XXXVI. Article XXXVII explicitly states that "[t]he present
Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the parties." Id.
art. XXXVII.
288. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on the Establishmentof a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N.- Sierra Leone,

Jan. 16, 2002, http://www.sierra-leone.org/special courtagreement.html.
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peace on its own. 289
Additionally, serious operational and
jurisdictional conflicts remain between the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court hybrid tribunal.290 If Sierra
Leone's precarious state of peace is to withstand the test of time, more
measures must be taken to ensure that it will not relapse into a state of
conflict.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO DURABLE PEACE:
SIERRA LEONE AND BEYOND

Two modifications to Fortna's peace schema would create a more
comprehensive framework for evaluating a peace agreement's
potential.
A. The Identity of Peacekeepers Should be Specified in the Agreement
First, the author recommends that the fourth factor under Fortna's
second tier include the caveat that peace durability is more likely
when the agreement not only provides for peacekeepers, but also
specifies the entity that is to supply them.29 1 This is a lesson learned
289. Sierra Leone was also dependent upon British troops to finally establish
peace in 2002. Hall & Kazemi, supra note 9, at 289. Also, British nationals
supervised Sierra Leonean police officers as recently as 2004. See Weissman, supra
note 2, at 64. "[T]he Security Council established a new mission-the United
Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)-to help consolidate peace
in the country. Its mandate was to cement UNAMSIL's gains and to help the
Government strengthen human rights, realize the Millennium Development Goals,
improve transparency and hold free and fair elections in 2007." United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone-UNAMSIL-Background, available at
http:// www.un.org[Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/background.html (last visited Nov.
2, 2007).
290. See Sriram, supra note 100, at 477-8 1.
291. Fortna speaks more generally of the benefits of having peacekeepers and
other third-party guarantees, with little discussion as to identifying their source. See
FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26-27. In discussing her fourth factor, she does mention
"international peacekeepers" and "[p]eacekeeping or monitoring by the United
Nations or a regional organization," but she does not underscore the significance of
specifying, in the agreement, who will provide the peacekeepers. See id. (emphasis
added). Fortna's fifth factor under the second tier of her schema, that peace
agreements are more successful when they are drafted with specificity, goes more
towards clarifying the location of the ceasefire lines to eliminate misunderstandings
flowing from the ceasefire, rather than to clarifying the identity and number of
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/11
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from the Abidjan Accord, where peace broke down when the parties
could not agree who would supply peacekeepers and in what
quantity,292 a foreseeable result of the parties' failure to address these

peacekeeping details in the agreement.2 93 Forthright communication
between belligerents on key issues like peacekeeping is essential to
the peace process, as peacekeepers are indispensable referees in postconflict situations. 294 The peace agreements that followed the Abidjan
Accord improved on the Accord's lack of peacekeeping details; both
the Conakry Peace Plan and the Lom6 Peace Agreement indicate the
295
identity and responsibilities of peacekeepers with greater precision.
Specifying the crucial details concerning peacekeeping would have
saved the parties a lot of time and trouble in the Sierra Leone example.
While Fortna stresses the importance of drafting an agreement with
specificity and using peacekeepers, her framework does not
adequately address how crucial specificity is in the peacekeeper
context.

2 96

At a minimum, peace agreements should specify the supplier of
the peacekeepers.
If this specification caveat is added to the
peacekeeping factor in Fortna's durable peace schema, combatants
using this framework will be better informed and will see eye-to-eye
with their opponent on the peacekeeping issue before the agreement is

peacekeepers to eliminate misunderstandings. See id. at 28 ('The more the exact
terms of an agreement are spelled out explicitly, the less possibility there is for
misunderstandings by the parties themselves or by international actors reacting to
perceived violations. Specification and demarcation of the cease-fire line's location
can help prevent small land grabs or salami tactics that can spark renewed
conflict.").
292. See KEEN, supra note 11, at 194.
293. See, e.g., Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, art. 8, 11 (simply stating that
"[t]he Parties shall request the international community to help supervise" and "shall
request the international community to provide neutral monitors" with little
specificity as to source or quantity).
294. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26-27.
295. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, arts. 1-3; see also Lomd Peace
Agreement, supra note 15, arts. III, IV, VI.
296. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 26-28 (noting that specific agreements
make it easier to determine whether a peace agreement has been violated and that
peacekeepers promote compliance, but failing to indicate the importance of
including peacekeeping specifics in the agreement).
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signed. 97 In addition to reducing the likelihood of disputes between
parties to a peace agreement, a more detailed description of the
peacekeeper's role better equips that peacekeeping entity to serve its
intended purpose. 29 8

Well-informed peacekeepers will be more

successful in achieving the warring parties' objectives.
B. The PoliticalAims of Belligerents Should be
Addressed in the Agreement
Second, the author recommends that Fortna's schema include a
ninth factor under the "deliberate attempts to enhance the durability of
peace" tier stating that peace agreements are more effective when they
address the political aims of the belligerents.2 99 Peace agreements are
stronger when they address political concerns because they
acknowledge political issues that sparked the war in the first place,
thus promoting mutual understanding between parties.300 This has
particular force when a party to the conflict is a rebel group, like the
RUF. By acknowledging policy concerns in a formal agreement,
297. Moreover, clearly identifying peacekeepers is also important from the
perspective of the peacekeeping force itself.
Cf DENNIS C. JETT, WHY
PEACEKEEPING FAILS
35 (1999) (noting that important elements of U.N.
peacekeeping operation planning include decisions about "mandates to
peacekeepers" and "who is chosen to lead"). Thus, the peacekeeper's identity is
something that should be contemplated by the parties and the prospective
peacekeepers before the agreement is signed.
298. See id. (Since "[t]he success or failure of a peacekeeping operation can be
preordained even before the arrival of the blue helmets on the scene of the conflict,"
providing a clear mandate for peacekeepers in the peace agreement before they are
deployed is crucial.).
299. Fortna does not include political settlement as a "Strength of Agreement."
See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 36, figure 1.1. While she recognizes that "peace
agreements that settle political issues lead to more durable peace," she "do[es] not
consider political settlement part of the strength of an agreement, but rathertest[s]
its effects separately." Id. at 30 (emphasis added). That is, because Fortna is "most
interested in how adversaries can maintain peace despite deeply conflicting
interests," she does not treat political settlement as a measure that can "alter
incentives, reduce uncertainty about actions and intentions, and control accidents."
Id. The author of this Note, on the other hand, purports that political concerns do
alter incentives and reduce uncertainty-just like the other eight factors under the
second tier of her schema.
300. Fortna acknowledges that "a political solution deals with [a conflict's]
root causes." Id.
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opposition groups can be more certain that their voice is being heard.
Moreover, an agreement that grants an opposition group access to the
political system decreases the incentive to overthrow the sitting
government by allowing the opposition to pursue their policy goals in
a democratic setting.
The need to acknowledge an aggressor's political standpoint was
clear in the Sierra Leone conflict, because the RUF's very motivation
to embark on its violent crusade arose from a desire for policy
reform. 30 ' The so-called "lumpen" youth who grew to become RUF
soldiers sought to upset the one-party rule of the corrupt APC and
were angered by their inability to integrate into Sierra Leone's
education system and urban economy. 302 Including the political aims
of belligerents in the peace agreement is not intended to conciliate
aggressors in hopes that they will be quieted. Rather, the author
suggests that by addressing, through the agreement, the political issues
which prompted the initial conflict, it is less likely that these issues
will prompt a repeat conflict.30 3
The Sierra Leone example illustrates the need to address the
political aims of belligerents by examining how the RUF's political
aim of reintegration was addressed in the peace agreements. 30 4 The
Abidjan Accord spoke only generally to "RUF reintegration," giving
the appearance that the drafters were only paying lip-service to an
RUF concern without conferring specific duties on the government to
effectuate this integration. 305 When the Sierra Leone government did
301. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 34, at 174.
302. See id. at 172-75; Weissman, supra note 2, at 43.
303. In support of the contention that acknowledging the political aims of
belligerents is essential to establishing durable peace, the U.N. Security Council
gives special consideration to "whether a clear political goal exists and whether it
can be reflected in the mandate" in deciding whether to send peacekeeping forces.
JETT, supra note 300, at 37 (quoting U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Office of Internal
Oversight Svcs., In-Depth Evaluation of Peace-Keeping Operations: Start-up

Phase, 12, U.N. Doc. E/AC.51/1995/2 (Mar. 17, 1995)). At least with respect to
the fact that including parties' political goals in the peace agreement encourages the
sending of peacekeepers, a provision addressing this issue in the peace agreement
promotes durable peace.
304. Transforming parties involved in the conflict (like the RUF) into political
parties is a way of addressing post-conflict political development often overlooked
as a peacebuilding strategy. CHESTERMAN, supra note 7, at 221.
305. See Abidjan Accord, supra note 13, arts. 5, 8, 14.
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not make affirmative efforts to integrate the RUF into mainstream
Sierra Leonean society, the RUF viewed the inaction as a breach,
igniting mistrust and resulting in the eventual breakdown of the peace
agreement. 30 6 Recognizing this fault in the Abidjan Accord, both
subsequent peace agreements addressed RUF integration concerns
with greater specificity. 30 7 Indeed, the most recent and successful
Sierra Leone peace agreement, the Lom6 Peace Agreement,
incorporates RUF integration aims into three separate articles: Article
III transforms the RUF into a political party; 30 8 Article IV permits
members of the RUF to run for political office; 30 9 and Article V deems
RUF members eligible for Cabinet appointments. 310 While the Lom6
Agreement did not independently stabilize Sierra Leone, the
progression of increasingly more detailed political integration
provisions in subsequent peace agreements suggests that the parties
were improving on past peace efforts by incorporating the RUF's
political aims.
C. Lessons Learned From Sierra Leone
Other countries need not learn this lesson the hard way. The
Sierra Leone case serves as an example to other countries drafting
peace agreements.
Indicating the identity and mandate of
peacekeepers in the agreement promotes clear communication
between parties and increases the chances that peacekeepers will
achieve the parties' objectives.311 If belligerents address each other's
political aims in the agreement, then the parties will be far less
compelled to pursue these political objectives through violence, and
the peace agreement could prevent future outbreaks of war. 3 12 This
new approach to the study of peace agreements may prove helpful to
306. The RUF broadcasted an "Apology to the Nation" which suggested that
the Sierra Leone People's Party violated its promises to integrate. See KEEN, supra
note 11, at 197.
307. See Conakry Peace Plan, supra note 14, art. 6; Lom6 Peace Agreement,
supra note 15, arts. III-V.
308. Lom6 Peace Agreement, supra note 15, art. III.
309. Id. art. IV.

310. Id. art. V.
311. See supra Part IV.A.
312. See supra Part IV.B.
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post-conflict peace efforts in Sierra Leone and beyond. The revised
forth the nine key
second tier of Fortna's peace durability schema sets
3 13
follows:
as
agreements
peace
factors for effective
1. Separation of troops from the ceasefire line
2. Creation of demilitarized zones
3. Imposition of arms control measures
4. Peacekeeping and third party guarantees which specify the
identity of the Peacekeepers
5. Specificity in the agreement's language
6. Implementation of confidence-building measures
7. Establishment of dispute resolution procedures
8. Formalizing the peace agreement
9. Addressing the politicalaims of stakeholders
Fortna's peace durability schema, thus modified, is applicable to
contemporary Sierra Leone, identifying aspects of peace maintenance
omitted in its most recent peace agreement (the Lom6 Peace
Agreement). Remedying these omissions may help ensure that Sierra
Leone does not regress into civil war. While drafting a new, more
comprehensive peace agreement at this time may not be necessary,
Sierra Leone and the international community should continue to
supplement the Lom6 Peace Agreement with additional peace building
The newly established U.N. Peacebuilding
mechanisms. 314
targeted focus on Sierra Leone, may prove
with
its
Commission,
313. With the exception of the italicized portions, this framework follows the
second tier of Fortna's peace durability schema. FORTNA, supra note 25, at 36.
Addressing the political aims of stakeholders in the agreement is not something
suggested by Fortna; rather, she "do[es] not consider political settlement part of the
strength of the agreement .. " Id. at 30.
314. Establishing the Special Court in Sierra Leone is an example of the
benefits supplemental peace mechanisms can bring with respect to adjudicating the
wrongs committed during the Sierra Leone civil war. On June 20, 2007, three
AFRC soldiers were convicted on various counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. Michelle Montas, Highlights of the Noon Briefing, U.N. NEWS SERVICE,
Additionally, Charles
June 20, 2007, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites.htm.
Taylor is being held in custody in the Hague at the writing of this article, awaiting
trial before the Special Court for his involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict. See
Prosecutor v. Charles Ghankay Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-PT [Sierra Leone]
[Spec. Ct.], availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/Taylor.html.
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indispensable to filling the gaps of the Lom6 agreement. 3 5 The U.N.
Peacebuilding Commission is the ideal taskforce to implement
mechanisms promoting durable peace in Sierra Leone since it is
tasked with marshalling the resources of the international community
in an effort to provide "integrated strategies for post-conflict
peacebuilding

and recovery,

.

.

.

focus[ing]

attention on the

reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery
from conflict . . . in order to lay the foundation for sustainable
31 6
development.

D. Illustration: The Conflict in Southern Sudan
In addition to using the revised Fortna framework to discover
which holes in the Lomd Peace Agreement need filling by the U.N.
Peacebuilding Commission, Fortna's modified schema can be utilized
to assist peace efforts in other countries as well. An illustrative
317
conflict comes right from the front pages: the situation in Sudan.
While the headlines typically focus on genocide in Darfur, 31 8 a
preeminent Sudanese issue receiving increased media attention is the
precarious state of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the
Sudan's Peoples Liberation Movement [SPLM] and the Sudanese
government .3 19 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement 3 20 is said to
315. See G.A. Res. 60/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005); S.C.
Res. 1645, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1645 (Dec. 20, 2005); see also U.N. Doc. PBC/OC/1/2

(June 21, 2006) (evidencing the U.N. Security Council's need for the U.N.
Peacebuilding Commission's updates on political developments in Sierra Leone).
316. G.A. Res. 60/180, 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/180 (Dec. 30, 2005).
317. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Darfur Rebels Kill 10 in Raid on Peace
Force, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007 at Al (front page New York Times article on
Sudan's struggle for peace in the Darfur region).
318. Jeffrey Gettleman, Ex-Rebels Quit Unity Government in Sudan, N.Y.

Oct. 12, 2007 at A14 ("While much of the recent international attention on
Sudan has been focused on Darfur, in the west, tensions over the fragile peace deal
in the south have been bubbling for months.").
319. See, e.g., id. (identifying that "American officials recently warned that
Sudan can plunge back into war"); U.S. Envoy Laments "Poisonous" Atmosphere
Dividing Sudan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007 at A21 (quoting U.S. envoy to Sudan as
saying "We are deeply concerned about the health of the C.P.A. [Comprehensive
Peace Agreement] . . . [t]ensions are rising."); Alisha Ryu, Sudan Peace Accord at
Risk as SPLM Pulls Out of Unity Government, NEWSVOA.COM, Oct. 12, 2007
http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-10-12-voa30.cfm (reporting that "John
TIMES,
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have ended the nearly fifty-year-old civil war in Southern Sudan in
2005,32 but the SPLM's recent withdrawal from the national unity
government invites skepticism as to the continued efficacy of the
322
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
The Sudanese civil war, fought between the northerners and the
southerners, has claimed over two million lives. 32 3
The
Comprehensive Peace Agreement ending the conflict does justice to
the modified peace durability schema offered here, comprising many
of the features suggested in the first eight factors. 324 The sticking
point, however, becomes the ninth factor: addressing the political aims
of stakeholders. While the Sudan peace agreement is certainly
comprehensive in the sense that it is lengthy, it fails to address
political concerns because it only acknowledges the SPLM political
party 32 5 This is problematic because "[m]any [other] political
players... had been hesitant to commit to an agreement they were not
Gachie, a political analyst and magazine editor in Juba, tells VOA that nonimplementation of the CPA is also threatening international efforts end the four-year
war between Khartoum and rebels in the western Darfur region of Sudan.").
320. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's
Liberation Army, Sudan-SPLM, Jan. 9, 2005, [hereinafter Comprehensive Peace
Agreement], available at http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf.
321.

See, e.g., M.W. DALY, DARFUR'S SORROW: A HISTORY OF DESTRUCTION

AND GENOCIDE XV (2007) (stating that "2005: Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ends civil war in Southern Sudan.").
322. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 318.
323. Id.
324. For example, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, incorporating several
protocols, has a dispute resolution procedure. Comprehensive Peace Agreement,
supra note 325, pmbl. ("[Recording and reconfirming] ... the Parties duly reached
agreement on .. . the Protocol on Power Sharing ... set out in Chapter II of the
CPA .. "); Comprehensive Peace Agreement, supra note 325, ch. II pt. 1.7 (Under
this article "[t]he Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national
reconciliation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace building
process.").
325. "The CPA is comprehensive in one sense only: it covers the core disputes
between Sudan's former national government and the SPLM. It is anything but
comprehensive from the perspective of the many groups in Sudan that were
excluded from the negotiations, and which now find themselves side-lined in the
political processes taking place under the CPA." Christian Murray & Catherine
Maywald, Subnational Constitution-Making in Southern Sudan, 37 RUTGERS L.J.
1203, 1205 (2006).
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party to."' 326

Moreover, SPLM is skeptical of the agreement with
respect to political concerns, referring to the national unity
government that the National Government Party (the ruling party)
agreed to in the C.P.A. as nothing more than a "charade," inciting the
party to pull out of the unity government. 327 Whether or not SPLM's
uncertainty about the National Government Party's intentions are
well-founded, the fact that political considerations have been the
breaking point of this Sudanese peace agreement underscores the
importance of including political aims as a factor in the peace
durability schema. 328 By so modifying the framework, it proves a
more effective mechanism for peace.
E. The Modified Framework as a Mechanism for Peace
In post-conflict countries where peace agreements have been
ineffective, this revised peace durability framework identifies
weaknesses in broken peace agreements, so that stakeholders might be
able to fill the gaps (with the help of the U.N. Peacebuilding
Commission or otherwise) accordingly.
Moreover, in war-torn
countries where a peace agreement has not yet been drafted, the
durable peace framework laid out above may prove even more helpful
as a preventive measure. If used as a checklist, the nine factors of
peace agreements fostering durable peace can be incorporated into an
initial peace agreement, ideally becoming the only agreement the
parties to the international or civil war will ever have to draft.
V. CONCLUSION

This article seeks to illustrate that Fortna's schema, supplemented
by the recommendations offered above, provides an interdisciplinary
approach that international lawyers can use to craft strong peace
agreements in an effort to prevent war-torn countries from lapsing
326. Sudan - UNMIS - Background, United Nations Mission in the Sudan,
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background.html (last visited Nov.
30, 2007).
327. Gettleman, supra note 318.
328. Clearly addressing political aims of stakeholders in a peace agreement
encourages durable peace because it reduces uncertainty about the intentions of
opponents. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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back into conflict. While historically there has been much debate
between international relations scholars and international lawyers, the
growth of interdisciplinary research in this area is mutually
beneficial. 329 Applied to the topic at hand, the peace durability
framework posited by a scholar of international relations-like
Fortna-can assist international lawyers in drafting effective peace
agreements by implementing the crucial elements of lasting peace
Reciprocally, insight into
agreements that she identifies.33 °
international law can reveal to international relations academics that
the legal status of peace agreements promotes long-lasting
compliance. 33 ' This exchange of expertise will promote the dialogue
needed to craft better peace agreements, in turn promoting brighter
and more stable futures for post-conflict countries.
As
The future of post-conflict Sierra Leone is uncertain.
identified by the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission Chairman in her
329. Much has been written on the movement towards International Relations
and International Law interdisciplinary scholarship. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter
et al., InternationalLaw and International Relations Theory: A New Generationof
InterdisciplinaryScholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998); William J. Aceves, The
Economic Analysis of International Law: Transaction Cost Economics and the
Concept of State Practice, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 995, 996-97 (1996)
("Recently, attempts have been made to forge a link between theories of
international relations and international law.").
330. See FORTNA, supra note 25, at 213 ("While some students of international
relations might be surprised to learn that states can institute measures to overcome
the obstacles of peace, practitioners probably know this already ....

By breaking

agreement strength into its component parts and examining the effects of each
measure systemically, we can evaluate what works and what does not work to
maintain peace.").
331. Peace agreements flowing from civil conflicts, such as those discussed
here, are not legally binding treaties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties because they are not "between States." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Even if peace agreements are not
recognized as treaties under international law, peace agreements can still become
"legalized" and enforceable. Legal, enforceable peace agreements make compliance
more likely. See Christine Bell, PeaceAgreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,
100 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 380-88 (2006) (arguing that civil war peace agreements,
like Sierra Leone's Lomd Peace Agreement legally bind the non-state parties
because, first, they are "subjects of international law" that are bound under Article 3
of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and second, non-state parties
manifest their intention to be bound on the international legal plane when they sign
peace agreements).
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report, the situation in Sierra Leone remains precarious, and the 2007
elections may determine the direction the country will take in
succeeding decades.3 3 2 Indeed, the new President is Ernest Koroma of
the All People's Congress party, 333 the very party the RUF targeted at
the inception of the Sierra Leone Civil War. 334 Even more uncertain
is how long it will take the thousands of human rights victims living in
Sierra Leone to heal from the physical, mental, and emotional wounds
of war.
Perhaps most uncertain, though, is the likelihood of
rehabilitation for those young perpetrators of human rights abuses,
conscripted into RUF ranks and forced to advance its gruesome
campaign, who are plagued by the wounds that come with wounding
another.
Peace for today's generation of Sierra Leonean youths rests on
shaky ground. To construct a sturdy foundation for peace, conditions
must be stabilized with peace-reinforcing mechanisms that inspire
confidence in both Sierra Leone and the international community.
The peace agreement framework offered here is one such mechanism.
It is only with the deliberate effort to employ peace building tactics
that succeeding generations of Sierra Leoneans will be freed from the
scourge of war. 3 35 Indeed, Sierra Leone is not the only nation whose
conflict-free future hangs in the balance. 336 The peace durability
framework offered in this article could inform peace building
solutions in any country attempting to heal from the scourge of war, in
hopes that future generations will be born into a more secure world.

332. Peacebuilding Commission Chairman, Report of the Peacebuilding
Commission Mission to Sierra Leone, 7, delivered to the Security Council and the
GeneralAssembly, U.N. Doc. S/2007/269, A/61/901 (May 10, 2007).
333. Press Release, U.S. State Dept., Ernest Bai Koroma sworn in as President
of Sierra Leone (Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://freetown.usembassy.
gov/pr091907.html.
334. See supra discussion Part I.A.
335. The preamble to the U.N. Charter provides: "We the peoples of the United
Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ..
U.N. Charter pmbl.
336. In Burundi, for example, the withdrawal of one of the joint monitoring
entities "concerned" the Secretary-General, because the withdrawal might
compromise the success of the ceasefire agreement. Marie Okabe, Highlights of the
Noon Briefing, U.N., July 27, 2007, http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilitesarchview.asp?HighlD=899.
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"Peace is precarious, but it is possible.

3' 3 7

Emily E. Bartholomew'

FORTNA, supra note 25, at 211.
J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, 2008; Claremont
McKenna College, B.A. International Relations, 2005. This Comment would not
have been possible without the thoughts and criticisms of Dean William J. Aceves.
Thanks to him for being the type of reader for whom one wants to write her best.

337.
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